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The eruption of violence in Poland since the Second World
War has twice resulted in massive changes in the Polish
leadership. At least one of those changeovers occurred in
the face of Soviet threats to intervene militarily. As
recently as 1976, violence again threatened the stability of
the Communist Party of Poland, indicating that the dangers
of upheaval are still very much present in that strategically
important East European state. This study analyzes develop-
ments in post-war Poland, with particular emphasis on the
turbulent events of 1956, 1970, and 1976, and develops pros-
pects for Poland's future vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. More
specifically, the conclusion evaluates the conditions under
which a future Soviet military intervention in the manner of
the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia can be expected, as well
as how the Poles might establish a very high degree of national
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I. INTRODUCTION
Three times since World War II, and twice during this
decade along (1970 and 1976) violence has erupted in Poland.
Riots in Poznan in 1956 and the subsequent "Polish October"
resulted in a massive overhaul of Polish leadership, the most
important aspect of which was the emergence of a new Communist
party chief, Wladyslaw Gomulka. Gomulka's ascendancy from
virtual banishment signaled a period of liberalization and
reform that was to but temporarily quell the strains of econ-
omics, political pressures, and worker unrest. Fourteen years
later the wheel of Polish history turned full circle, and
Wladyslaw Gomulka was himself forced to resign as First
Secretary following violent riots in several coastal cities.
His successor, Edward Gierek, again instituted a degree of
political and economic change and managed to steer the new
Polish leadership through another period of relative calm and
order. This time the lull lasted a scant five-and-a-half
years before storm clouds gathered again over Poland. Gierek
managed to weather the storm of demonstrations and riots that
occurred in 19 76, but surely they were manifest evidence of
what Victor Zorza, writing recently in the Washington Post ,
referred to as "Omens in Eastern Europe." But omens, omi-
nous trends, political and social dissent -- even violence
and upheaval that result in dramatic changes in party and
Victor Zorza, "Omens in Eastern Europe," Washington
Post, Jan 26, 1977.

governmental leadership, are in and of themselves but
"indicators" of fundamental issues in world power relation-
ships. It is not the rise and fall of the Gomulkas and the
Giereks that determines the survival or the destruction of
political systems or the physical security of the world.
Lurking in the shadows of those indicators however, are more
crucial questions that demand examination. With regard to
developments in Eastern Europe, those questions revolve
around the Soviet Union. For as Ray S. Cline, Executive
Director of Studies at the Georgetown University Center for
Strategic and International Studies (and former CIA Deputy
Director for Intelligence)/ so aptly states:
"A lot of fashionable nonsense has been written in recent
years about the passage of world affairs from an era of
bipolarity (U.S. -USSR conflict) to a condition of multi-
polarity. There is some truth in these assertions, but
in many respects they are dangerously wrong. The world
is still, to a remarkable extent, divided between a
sphere of influence dominated by the USSR. .. and. . .by
the United States." 2
How then are developments in Eastern Europe perceived by
Soviet leaders? And how does the Soviet Union react to those
developments? The central theme underlying this analysis of
the Polish riots will be an examination of those fundamental
issues of Soviet perceptions and responses. Conclusions of
this analysis will include projections of possible develop-
ments in Poland, with particular emphasis on the prospects
2
Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 1975), p. 9.

for Poland's course toward national autonomy and independence,
and the inherent dangers of a future Soviet military inter-
vention, which would have grave consequences for the stability
of central Europe. If intervention should occur, it might
have serious repercussions in the Germanies and other European
states, and would undoubtedly increase the risk of major war.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF POST-WAR POLAND
An analysis of upheaval in Poland, and especially the
Poznan riots of 19 56 and the Polish October that followed,
must begin with an historical perspective of events leading
up to that crisis. A convenient place to begin, especially
with regard to Poland vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, is the
situation as it existed at the termination of the Second
World War.
During the closing phases of the war there had been two
Polish provisional governments. In addition to the govern-
ment in exile in England, there was also a Soviet-sponsored
Committee of National Liberation in the Russian-occupied part
of Poland. At Russian insistence (and Western acquiescence)
the two groups merged to form a "Provisional Government of
National Unity." This coalition lasted only until 1947, when
the Communists managed to oust all opposition and assumed
complete control. The installation of this puppet Communist
regime in Warsaw represents one of the few really classic
operations of the Soviet Union, and therefore deserves some
elaboration.
Given the fact that the Poles, perhaps foremost among the
Eastern Europeans, were (and are) possessed with intense
nationalism and a relatively high degree of homogeneity, it
Jerome Blum, Rondo Cameron, and Thomas Barnes, The




would seem that they would be the least likely to succumb to
4Soviet domination. They were deeply steeped in Roman
Catholicism and, had a demonstrated craving for such basic
democratic principals as freedom of speech, private ownership,
5and self-government.
In 1942, Polish Communists in Moscow sent agents to their
occupied homeland to form a new Workers' Party, which in the
following year, was assigned to Gomulka, a "native" Communist
who had remained at home. When the Germans discovered the
c.
mass graves of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, the Poles
accused the Soviets who then broke off diplomatic relations
with the provisional government in exile in London. A (mostly
Communist) Committee of National Liberation was formed, with
headquarters in Lublin. As the Red Army advanced, the Home
Army, organized by the London Poles, found itself shunned by
the "healthy forces" and was refused aid during the famous
7Warsaw revolt, and was subsequently crushed by the then
4Edward A. Morrow, writing in the New York Times , Aug 12,
1952 refers to the Poles as "The Irish of the Slav Peoples,"
with a nationalism as strong as that of the Irish or Yugoslavs.
5 ...Richard Staar, The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe
(Stanford: University Press, 1971), pp. 130-132.
"The Katyn Forest Massacre," Hearings Before the Select
Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence
and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82 Congress,
1st Session, 8 volumes. (Washington: U.S. Govt Printing Office,
1952-1953) . Volume 8 contains a very good summary.
7Joseph W. Zurawski, Poland: The Captive Satellite
(Detroit: Endurance Press, 1962), p. 21. The courageous but
futile efforts of the Warsaw Poles, especially the ghetto
Jews, is a central theme immortalized in Leon Uris ' best-selling
novel, Mila-18 (New York: Bantam Books, 1961).
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desperate Germans. Following the seizure of the devastated
capital by the Red Army, and the expulsion of the German
forces, the Lublin government was thus in complete control.
One of the thorniest post-war problems in Polish-Soviet
relations was the determination of Poland's boundaries. As
early as 1944, Soviet intentions were clearly outlined in an
interesting Tass communique in which the Soviets suggested




This document left little doubt that the Soviet
Union was determined to permanently incorporate eastern areas
of Poland into the Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. The issue
of Poland's boundaries, and especially the Oder-Neisse line
of demarcation between Poland and Germany, would loom large
in future inter-bloc relations. Refusal of the future Federal
Republic of Germany to accept the Oder-Neisse boundary tended
to force Poland into a perpetual state of dependence upon the
Soviet Union, as the Bloc's senior member, to ensure stability.
(Later, Poland will take initiatives to reach agreement with
Western Germany, thus eliminating an important source of
dependence on the Soviets.) In all fairness to the Soviet
Union however, we should not overlook the fact that she received
considerable encouragement and support from the Western powers
with regard to her grand design for a buffer Poland. Stalin
must have been pleasantly surprised if not actually astounded
g
"Declaration on Soviet-Polish Relations," Tass (Moscow)
Jan 10, 1944, in USSR Information Bulletin, Vol IV, No. 7,
19 44, p. 1. Document appears in Alvin Rubinstein, The Foreign





at Teheran in 19 43 when Churchill, on his own initiative,
proposed adjusting Poland's borders westward at the expense
9
of Germany. Churchill's own account of how he demonstrated
to Stalin, "... with the help of three matches my idea of
Poland moving westward," and that "...this pleased Stalin,"
without even the participation of a single Polish representa-
tive, is a monument to the perversities of political history.
The fate of a nation, over which only a few years earlier
nearly the entire world had been drawn into mortal conflict,
was now being decided by the manipulation of a few match
sticks. Stalin had every reason to be pleased! Indeed, his
visions of a dismembered Germany and new Polish frontiers
that were well formed as far back as 1941, appeared to be
on the way to fulfillment.
At Yalta in 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill decided to with-
draw recognition of the exiled Polish government in London,
thus further ensuring the eventual domination of the Moscow-
sponsored Lublin government. On the Party scene, Gomulka,
who was chosen by the Communist underground to head the Party
in 1942 while Poland was still occupied by the Germans, was
replaced by Boleslaw Bierut who returned from the Soviet Union
Q




For a well-documented analysis of Stalin's early atti-
tude concerning his plans for post-war frontiers, see "Stalin
and die Oder-Neisse Linie," by Boris Meissner, in Osteuropa ,
(Stuttgart) , No. 1, October 1951, pp. 2-11.
13

with the Red Army in 1944. At first Beirut headed the new
Polish government, but was Stalin's choice to replace Gomulka
(who was purged in 1948 when Stalin, in an attempt to circum-
vent any further Titoist defections, decided to replace East
European nativists with more dependable "Muscovites") as
Party chief. Henceforth the Sovietization of Poland advanced
at a rapid pace and the government and Party quickly assumed
the role of a willing instrument of Soviet policy. Early in
1949 Poland joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) , which the Soviets had set up as the counterpoise
to the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan) , and later that
year, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky was assigned as Polish
12Minister of Defense and Marshal of the Polish Armies.
Gomulka was placed under house arrest and later jailed at
Stalin's order in 19 51, and though released in 1954, remained
13
a virtual prisoner with the label, "nationalist-deviationist ."
The "New Course" of Communism following Stalin's death in
19 53 and the period of de-Stalinization following Khrushchev's
famous secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in Febru-
ary, 19 56, in which he blazonly denounced the former Vozhd ,
(supreme leader) , are popularly believed to have generated a
gradual relaxation in Soviet control of satellite states.
The Poles, however, even during Stalin's tyrannical rule
managed to demonstrate anti-Soviet sentiment. Following a
12New York Times , Nov 7-8, 1949.
13New York Times, Dec 19, 19 70.
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little-known incident that occurred in April, 19 51, some 1500
Poles were arrested for participating in riots in Stettin,
when a Russian major reportedly shot and killed five Polish
citizens during an altercation. Anti-Soviet sentiments were
raised to the highest pitch since the war, wiping out all
theoretical gains in Soviet-Polish friendship relations. A
Soviet board of inquiry composed of senior Russian officers
treated the entire incident with a great deal of secrecy,
even to the degree that all persons who had been killed,
including four Polish policemen, were buried the day follow-
ing the riots — without even notification of their next of
km!
But for a few years after Stalin's death, at least until
Khrushchev's vituperative denounciation referred to above,
any measure of relaxation in Soviet policy was confined to
internal affairs, with little change in Moscow's relations
with the "peoples' democracies." Reports of "fraternal
cooperation" between the peoples' democracies and the Soviet
Union not withstanding, ferment in the satellites was to set
in almost immediately following Stalin's death.
The first post-Stalin disturbance to occur inside an
Eastern state was the strike of June, 19 5 3 in the former
Skoda works of Plzen (Pilsen) , Czechoslovakia. While currency
reform and the subsequent depreciation of wages, savings, and
14Edward R. Morrow, New York Times (a special report)
,
May 15, 1951. Also cited in Facts on File , Vol XI, No. 550,
May 11-17, 1951, p. 153 in a report from Paris.
15

bonds was the immediate cause, Kremlin leaders must have
drawn pause for thought when Czech rioters stepped on pictures
of Stalin and Gottwald and violated the Soviet flag. The
U.S. flag was hoisted in several placed and posters proclaimed,
"U.S. Come Back!" and "Robbery is the Russian Paradise."
Then only a few days following the Plzen riots, uprisings
occurred in the Eastern zone of Germany, which were of even
16larger dimensions. For the purpose of this analysis the
important aspect of the East German riots was the consterna-
tion with which the Kremlin leaders reacted to the obvious
anti-Soviet sentiments in a peoples 1 democracy. They found
it necessary to accuse the Western press of lying when it
17
reported the anti-government attitudes of East Berliners
.
The arrest and execution of Beria in December, 19 53 was
the beginning of extensive purges of secret police through-
out the Soviet bloc that lasted into 19 55 and 19 56. The
strong reins of the MGB (now the KGB) over the satellite
agencies were considerably loosened, and although Soviet
"advisors" were still at their posts in the peoples' democ-
racies, there was no longer a strong hand to direct them
from Moscow. In Poland, for example, Bezpieka , the secret
police agency established under Stalin, served as both Polish
Time , Vol. LXI , No. 25, Jun 22, 1953, p. 33.
New York Times , Jun 23, 1953.
17David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin
(Philadelphia: Lippincott Co., 1960), pp. 176-177.
16

security and the means of Soviet control over Poland. The
heads of the seventeen departments of Bezpieka were Poles,
but all decisions were made by their Russian "assistants"
and advisors. The real head of the Polish police was not
Radkiewicz, but the Soviet general, Lalin. The following
quote from News From Behind the Iron Curtain well illustrates
the degree to which the Polish security system was infested
with Soviet control:
"In a crowd surrounding Bierut like an unsurmountable
wall we can easily distinguish. .. a Soviet colonel,
F. Grzybowski, Director of the Department of Government
Officials' Protection, his deputies, Soviet officers,
Colonels Debowski, Klaroff, and. . .Lozovoj . Next to
them are several dozen men dressed in dark suits with
their hands on the revolvers in their pockets. These
are other Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians
from Bierut's private bodyguard unit. . .The Bezpieka
constitutes the spearhead of Soviet aggression by means
of which Bierut, and through him Moscow, rules Poland ."
(emphasis added) ^%~
But without a Stalin or a Beria, the secret police in Poland
gradually became more and more responsible and subordinated
to the Party leadership. This in turn decreased the direct
control of Moscow and increased the potential for factional
rivalries within the Party, a phenomenon that would become
synonymous with, and to a large degree responsible for, future
crises in Poland.
In his scholarly history of Soviet foreign policy,
19Expansion and Coexistence, Adam Ulam titled one of his
18News From Behind the Iron Curtain (New York), Vol. 4,
No. 3, March 19 55, pp. 6 and 22.
19Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York:
Praeger, 1968), p. 572.
17

chapters, "The Perils of Khrushchev." He opens that chapter
with the following lines:
"With his historic denounciation of Stalin at the 20th
Party Congress in 19 56, Nikita Khrushchev opened a new
era in Soviet politics .. .But his career at the top was
precarious. It was shaken by events during the fall of
1956, and in the winter of 1956-57 it appeared that he
might be superseded. " 2
Indeed one of the most dangerous of Khrushchev's "perils"
would be developments in Poland -- a peril that would outlast
Khrushchev to plague his successors as well. For several
years Russian leadership throughout the Communist world had
been undisputed: Russian ideology was held all-wise and the
teaching of Lenin and Stalin infallible; Russian Communisn
was error-free. Even the culture of satellite states, such
as Poland, had been undergoing remodeling after the Soviet
pattern: schools and universities taught the social sciences
according to Russian interpretation; Russian language was
prescribed for youth; foreign affairs assumed bellicose
anti-Western attitudes; military and police affairs were
controlled by Soviet agents; the economy served Soviet econ-
omic needs. But now, Khrushchev had shown the many errors
of the late dictator, and disappointment in Russia was felt
by large sections of the Communist world. Ulam goes so far
as to connect the shock of Khrushchev's great revelation with
20tu-^Ibid.

the heart attack and eventual death of Boles law Beirut, who
21
was in attendance at the Congress in Moscow.
Whatever the actual cause however, Bierut's death did
create a certain degree of confusion in the Polish Party,
and in order to ensure a rapid and amenable (amenable to the
Soviet Union, that is) solution to the succession problem,
Khrushchev himself flew to Warsaw to supervise the selection
of a new first secretary, though ostensibly he was there to
attend Bierut's funeral. It was here that Khrushchev alleg-
edly reproached the Polish Central Committee for having "too
22
many Abramoviches around" — an obvious burst of anti-
Semitism, but nevertheless sufficient admonition to ensure
the election of Edward Ochab, an impeccable Aryan — but one
who would prove incapable of riding herd over the Polish
peril, which was to raise its head within just a few months.
21There is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding
Bierut's death. Myron Rush, in How Communist States Change
Their Rulers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp.
76-77, attributes the death to an illness that began while
at the 20th Congress in Moscow. Erwin Weit, Gomulka's
personal interpreter, attributes Beirut's death to a suicide.
"I was able to learn,, , that Boleslaw Beirut, .. .did not die
of heart failure in Moscow as the official communique stated,
but committed suicide after the. . .Congress .. .when Khrushchev
condemned Stalin and his methods. Bierut...was instructed
to go back to Poland and dismantle the now discredited cult
of the personality. It was like asking a wolf to turn
vegetarian." Ostblock Intern (Hamburg: 1970), p. 37.
22Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 578.
19

Answers to key questions concerning historical events
are seldom clear-cut and simplistic. As a matter of fact,
depending upon one's vantage point or frame of reference,
significantly different answers to specific questions often
suggest themselves. To illustrate this point the riots and
tumultous demonstrations in Poland will be examined using
a "dual- look" approach. The events of 19 56, for example,
will be looked at from a more-or-less traditional (Western)
frame of reference, and then from a Soviet perspective.
When analyzing the events of 19 70 and 19 76, on the other
hand, the first look will concentrate on economic conditions
as determinants, whereas the second look will focus on the
internal politics of Poland, and whenever evidence permits,
on how they were probably perceived in the Soviet Union. In
truth, the "correct" answers to questions of causes and




III. POZNAN AND THE POLISH OCTOBER
Riots in Poland in 1956 and the subsequent Polish October
which resulted in the ascendency of a new Communist regime
under Wladyslaw Gomulka, without direct Soviet military
intervention, are largely overshadowed by the explosive events
which soon followed in Hungary which did result in ruthless
Soviet suppression. But it is precisely because the Polish
crisis did not end this way that it warrants critical and
careful investigation. Therefore, the crucial question that
should drive such an investigation of the 19 56 Polish crisis
is, why did the Soviet Union choose not to resort to military
force in order to impose its will on the Poles?
A. POLAND, 19 56: A FIRST LOOK
Khrushchev's campaign of de-Stalinization reached its peak
at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, in February 19 56,
particularly in his extraordinary "secret" speech. In an
attempt to blame Stalin for the break with Tito, Khrushchev
introduced a basic doctrinal shift — that there can be several
23
roads to Socialism. This undoubtedly added impetus to
nationalism and unrest throughout the peoples' democracies and
Poland was certainly no exception. The sudden death of
24Boleslaw Beirut soon after Khrushchev's speech, and the necessity
for the de-Stalinist rehabilitation of Gomulka, created division
23Robert V. Daniels, ed., A Documentary History of
Communism , Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage BooJcs, 196U) , pp. 224-2 31
24See fn 21, p. 19.
21

within the Party and severely complicated Bierut's successor,
Edward Ochab's chances of consolidation. Added to this
tangled political skein was a downward economic trend,
especially in the area of consumer goods and services, caused
largely by a Soviet-imposed shift from a pre-war agricultural
economy to a post-war industrial-based one. This shift,
while beneficial to the USSR, resulted in immense strain on
the Polish consumer who in 19 56 had to rely upon more expen-
25
sive imported grains and meat products. In a timely piece
of journalism that was almost prescient of the June riots
which erupted in Poznan, Harry Schwartz of the New York Times
(May 21, 1956) in a report titled "Poles Report Lag in Beer
and Soap," analyzed previously secret statistics, and con-
cluded that the Polish consumer was indeed fairing poorly.
Barely one month later in protest over more stringent
production norms and an unsatisfactory bonus system, Polish
workers led by employees of the Zispo Engineering Plant went
26
on strike in Poznan on the 28th of June. Streets were
27blocked by demonstrators, and by 8:00 AM rioting broke out.
DNew York Times , Feb 26, 1956. In a special to the Times
titled "Poland on the Rock of Two Revolutions," C.B. Sulzberger
(in Warsaw) analyzed economic conditions in Poland, and filed
this report the day prior to Khrushchev's secret speech.
26Facts on File , Vol. XVI, No. 818, Jun 27-Jul 3, 1956,
p. 217.
27New York Times , June 30, 1956. News coverage of the
Poznan riots was especially good, since an international trade
fair was being held in that city and Western eyewitness
accounts were unusually abundant.
22

Polish infantry and tank units were rushed into Poznan by
early afternoon and while several government buildings were
demolished, the revolt was crushed by early morning of
30 June. Warsaw Radio reported that some 48 persons had
been killed and another 424 wounded, but Western sources who
were in Poznan during the riots estimated casualties at 200-
28300 dead.
The most significant result of the Poznan riots was the
emergency meeting of the Polish United Workers (Communist)
Party's Central Committee in October, which appeared to
recognize the stabilizing effect of reinstating Gomulka to
his seat in the Politburo as Party chief. Khrushchev and an
impressive entourage flew to Warsaw in an apparent attempt
to intimidate the Poles, demanding withdrawal of Gomulka 's
nomination under the threat of armed force. The Poles, under
the inspired leadership of Gomulka, stood firm, and in the
words of journalist, John Gunther, "Khrushchev receded, and
overnight Poland found itself miraculously free of the entire
29
apparatus of Soviet control."
What then were the primary causes of the 1956 Polish
crisis, and more importantly, why was the Polish October
allowed to succeed without Soviet military intervention?
Based on the foregoing evaluation of the events , it appears
that the Poznan riots were a result of economic strain
28Pacts on File , No. 818, Jun 27-Jul 3, 1956, p.- 217.
29John Gunther, Inside Europe Today (New York: Harper






manifested in worker resentment of conditions. Economic
conditions were complicated on one hand by a sense of growing
nationalism following the period of de-Stalinization, and on
another by the confused state of factionalism within the
Party and government following Bierut's untimely death. The
subsequent ascendancy of Gomulka and general liberalization
in the formation of a new Polish Politburo, while not exactly
to Khrushchev's liking, did not warrant Soviet military inter-
vention. The shakeup in leadership, after all, was (according
to Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Democratic Presidential candidate)
30
"only a substitute of Communist masters." Personal feelings
—not withstanding, Gomulka did appear to be the most likely
choice of leaders to introduce the necessary measures of
authority and stability to effectively quell unrest in Poland,
the largest of the peoples' republics and the one with the
longest Russian frontier.
B. POLAND, 195 6: A SECOND LOOK
Seen through the eyes of the Soviets however, the Poznan
riots and the Polish October had much more serious implica-
tions. While starting with purely economic demands, the
Poznan strikes and riots quickly assumed all the traits of a
major political revolt. Within minutes after the Poznan
rioters began clamoring for chleba. (bread) , Polish flags were
30New York Times, Oct 22, 1956, p. 16.
24

unfurled and the ancient hatred of Pole for Russian surfaced
as the demonstration turned into an expression of Polish
nationalism. Momentum mounted over the next few hours and
posters appeared with purely political slogans such as "We
Want Freedom!" "Down With Phony Communism!" and "Down With
the Russkies!" To put teeth into these demands, the crowds
then attacked the Communist Party Headquarters building and
a foreign-broadcast jamming station — both obviously politi-
32
cal targets. Even Khrushchev states in his memoirs that
the Poznan riots had distinctly anti-Soviet overtones. He
was especially concerned that there was agitation for the
removal of Marshal Rokossovsky as Commander in Chief of the
Polish Army, attesting to the importance which he placed on
Soviet control of Polish forces. Khrushchev became even
further alarmed when Waclaw Komar was released from prison
and put in command of the internal security forces, a move
which provided potential para-military support for the replace-
ment of the pro-Soviet Ochab leadership with a new nationalist-
oriented one under Gomulka. According to Khrushchev, "In
short, it looked to us as though developments in Poland were
rushing forward on the crest of a giant anti-Soviet wave....




Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin , p. 339
32New York Times , Jun 30, 1956.
Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testa-
ment (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), pp. 198-200.
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Despite Soviet emphasis on Party unity, Poznan had created
a top-level split in the country between a Stalinist faction,
known by their meeting place as Natolinites , " and a revision-
ist faction of social democrats and evolutionary communists
who stressed gradual changes in Poland in the direction of
34institutional reform. Ochab, though originally a Stalinist,
attempted to straddle the two factions, but soon lost all
necessary influence as Party leader. In Khrushchev's own
35
words, "He was a beaten man."
Pressures within the Polish leadership mounted for reform
and it became increasingly clear that only Gomulka could serve
as the necessary symbol of Polish unity and national independ-
3 6
ence, a situation that was totally unpalatable to the
Kremlin.
The Polish Eighth Plenum met on October 19, and Gomulka
was reinstated as a Central Committee member. Ochab left
little doubt as to the direction the Plenum was to take when
he announced Gomulka 's candicacy for First Secretary of the
Party. The meeting was abruptly suspended, however, when news
came of Khrushchev's unannounced arrival in Warsaw at the head
of a platoon of Soviet Party chieftans, including Deputy
Premiers Molotov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich, Warsaw Pact Com-
37
mander, Marshal Konev, and Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov.
O A
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1967), pp. 249-251.
35Khrushchev Remembers
, p. 201.
36New York Times , Oct 9, 1956.
37New York Times , Oct 21, 1956.
26

It is clear that the purpose of such an impressive array of
clout was to intimidate the Poles into acceptance of Soviet
demands. Khrushchev presented the Poles with an ultimatum
demanding retention of the old Politburo (meaning retention
of Ochab and Rokossovsky but not Gomulka) and a slow-down in
Poland's tendency toward bourgeois nationalism. Khrushchev
reportedly threatened military intervention by two Soviet
divisions that were moving toward Warsaw. At the same time,
Soviet military units stationed in East Germany began moving
3 8
eastward. Polish tenacity and stubbornness must have
amazed the Soviet heavyweights. Even Ochab, Khrushchev's
"beaten man," upon learning of the movement of Soviet troops
reportedly told Khrushchev, "...if you do not stop them
immediately, we will walk out of here and break off all con-
tact... Don't think you can keep us here and start a putsch
outside. .. .The Party and our workers have been warned and they
39
are ready." Later, Khrushchev recounted Gomulka ' s reaction
to the word that Konev had moved Soviet troops closer to
Warsaw. "He came to me and said, 'Comrade Khrushchev, I've
just received a report that some of your forces are moving
toward Warsaw. I ask — I demand — that you order them to
stop and return to their bases. If you don't, something
40
terrible and irreversible will happen."
38Facts on File , Vol. XVI, No. 834, OCT 17-23, 1956, p. 345.
39ibia.
Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 203-204.
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By the following morning, 20 October/ the Soviets accepted
a proposed list of Polish Politburo members with Gomulka as
First Secretary. That afternoon , in an address to the Polish
Communist Party Central Committee , the new First Secretary,
Wladyslaw Gomulka, stated that "Every country has the right
to be independent and sovereign. . . .The most powerful trend
sweeping the country is the call for democratization of our
life." 41
This was truly an unprecedented situation for the Soviet
leadership. The success of the Polish October represented
perhaps the greatest crack in the Communist monolith since
the Yugoslav defection of 1948.
The cause of the Poznan riots is not quite as simplistic
as the previous analysis (a first look) would suggest. Here
we see that while economic problems and worker dissatisfac-
tion may have been the spark which set off the demonstrations
and riots , there could have been little doubt in the minds of
the Soviet leadership that the underlying cause was the deep-
seated, anti-Soviet sentiment on the part of the Poles which
was allowed to surface because of the liberalization through-
out the Communist world associated with Khrushchev's de-
Stalinization measures. To this was added the growing feeling
of Polish nationalism. The confrontation between the Russians
and the Poles and the subsequent success of the Polish October,
especially the ascendancy of Gomulka and the expulsion of
Rokcssovsky, represented a serious challenge to Soviet hegemony
Daniels, Documentary History of Communism, pp. 235-240.
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in Poland — a challenge that might indeed spread to other
East European nations. George Kennan went so far as to say
that the Polish October underscored "an extensive disintegra-
42tion of Moscow's authority within the Soviet sphere."
Milovan Djilas, in an article for which he was sentenced by
a Yugoslav court to a three-year prison term, referred to
43the Polish October as the "triumph of national Communism."
Viewed from a Soviet perspective, the question of why the
Soviets chose not to intervene militarily looms even larger
than it did in the earlier analysis. Nor in view of this
Soviet perspective can we accept the proposition (attributed
earlier to Adlai Stevenson) that Gomulka merely represented
a change in Communist masters. In attempting to answer
whether it might not have been better for the Soviet Union
to intervene by force of arms in order to preserve their
undisputed hegemony, Zbigniew Brzezinski poses a set of fac-
tors which together translate into Soviet indecision and a
policy of "wait-and-see." He attributes Soviet non-interven-
tion to the danger of undermining relations with Tito,
Chinese recommendation of patience, and fear of giving creda-
bility to those elements within the Soviet leadership which
44
were in opposition to the de-Stalinization campaign. These
all were undoubtedly contributing factors. The Chinese, for
42New York Times , Oct 21, 1956, p. IV- 1.
4 3 . .. •Milovan Djilas, "The Storm in Eastern Europe," in
Readings in Russian Foreign Policy , ed. R. A. Goldwin (New
York: Oxford University Press, 19 59) , pp. 630-63 7.




example, were indeed supporting the Poles in their bid for
an independent path to Communism as early as 15 October,
when Mao Tse-tung indicated his disapproval of the Soviet
45effort to re-establish a single road. Chou En-lai few to
Moscow, then to Warsaw, to act as moderator and to urge
46Soviet restraint. But further analysis from a Soviet
perspective suggests that the central issue was the obvious
threat — indeed, demonstrable proof! — that the Poles
would fight. A New York Times press account of the stormy
encounter between the Poles and the Russians that occurred
at the 19 October Central Committee meeting, credits
Khrushchev with the following comment. "I will show you what
the way to Socialism looks like. If you don't obey, we will
crush you. We are going to use force to kill all sorts of
47
risings in this country." This is altogether believable,
and certainly in keeping with Khrushchev's diplomatic approach
to international relations. The threat was given believ-
ability by the presence of Molotov and Kaganovich in the Soviet
delegation, known "hard-liners." And, the presence of Marshals
Konev and Zhukov indicated more than just a passing interest
in the Polish proceedings on the part of the Soviet military.
i
45Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs. Pekin
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 53.
46 Ibid.
47New York Times, Oct 21, 1956, p. IV- 1.
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Indeed, Zhukov, according to U.S. Ambassador C. E. Bohlen,
4 8urged military action in Poland but was probably overruled.
But the Poles stood firm. Gomulka countered Khruschev's
moves by mobilizing the Polish internal security forces
under the recent command of General Komar, arming factory
workers in Warsaw, and winning the allegiance of many units
49
of the Polish army. " Perhaps the best indication of Soviet
perception of the situation can be gleaned from Khrushchev's
own words
:
"Marshal Konev and I held separate consultations with
Comrade Rokossovsky, who was more obedient to us but
had less authority then the other Polish leaders. He
told us that anti-Soviet, nationalistic, and reactionary
forces were growing in strength, and that if it were
necessary to arrest the growth of these counterrevolu-
tionary elements by force of arms, he was at our disposal;
we could rely on him to do whatever was necessary to
preserve Poland's socialist gains and to assure Poland's
continuing fidelity and friendship. That was all very
well and good, but as we began to analyze the problem in
more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could
count on to obey Rokossovsky, the situation began to look
somewhat bleak . Of course, our armed strength far exceeded
that of Poland, but we didn't want to resort to the use of
our own troops if at all avoidable. 50 (Emphasis added)
That the Soviets tested the resolve of the Poles to fight can
hardly be doubted. Russian troops based in East Germany for
example, massed on the Polish frontier on 19 October and asked
permission to cross into Sczeczin (Stettin) . When refused by
48Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History , 1929-1969 (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1973) , p. 409. Recounting the Polish October,
Zhukov told Bohlen, "... there had been more than enough Soviet
troops... to force settlement on Kremlin terms. (We) could have
crushed them like flies."
49Stefan Korbonski, Warsaw in Chains (New York: Macmillan
Co., 1959), p. 304. Korbonski reports that Stefan Staszewski,
secretary of the Warsaw PZPR Committee, had 60,000 workers
armed and ready to resist any attack on Warsaw by Russian troops.
Additionally, he reports that there were several thousand youths
prepared to mobilize against the Russians.
^Khrushchev Remembers, p. 20 3.
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Polish border units, they attempted to cross anyway, but were
51promptly fired upon by Polish units and withdrew. It is
highly unlikely that the Russian troops were acting on their
own initiative. More probably they had received orders to
proceed into Poland only if they met no armed resistance.
Military intervention is by no means an automatic Soviet
response to the takeover of an Eastern European Communist
Party by a domestic faction, or to the transition from Soviet
satellite to a national Communism. The Yugoslavs succeeded
in 19 48, Albania in 19 61, and the Romanians (to a large de-
gree), in the mid-19 60s. Khrushchev's intervention in Hungary
in 1956 was not directed at a domestic faction of the Hungar-
ian Communist Party attempting to take over from Muscovites --
but at putting down an uprising against all elements of the
Hungarian single-party dictatorship. Gomulka and the Poles,
on the other hand, did not threaten to break from the Com-
munist fold. On the contrary, the Poles were able to reason-
ably assure the Soviets that they would continue to operate
within acceptable limits of socialist Communism. Furthermore,
by threatening to resist military intervention, the Poles
confronted the Soviets with the necessity of killing Eastern
Europeans — soldiers, civilians, and Communist Party members
alike.
Otto P. Chaney, Jr., Zhukov (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 376. See also the New York Times ,
Oct 21, 1956, which carried the front page headline, "Poles





The answer then, to why the Soviets did not resort to
military intervention in Poland in 19 56, is that in Soviet
eyes (at least in the eyes of those whose judgment prevailed)
,
the risks were too high to be justified by expected payoffs.
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IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE POLISH OCTOBER
The rise to power of Gomulka followed by several important
Soviet concessions to the Poles highlighted the Polish October
as an overwhelmingly successful bid for a significant measure
of national autonomy. Soviet officers and advisors were
quickly removed from positions in the Polish armed forces and
Party administration. Cardinal Wyszinski was released from
prison and a new agreement was negotiated between the Church
and State. Negotiations were opened in Moscow between the
Poles and Russians which, in November 19 56, resulted in the
52
recognition of Poland's "full sovereignty and independence."
Among other concessions won by Poland was the cancellation of
a 2.4-billion ruble debt owed to the Soviet Union (against
coal deliveries made since 1945), credit to buy 1.4-million
tons of grain, and 700-million rubles in credit for other
commodities . And while it was agreed that Soviet forces would
'temporarily" remain in Poland (to guard against the threat of
German aggression against Poland's Oder-Neisse frontier),
Poland was assured that Soviet troops would not interfere in
53
Poland's internal affairs and would be subject to Polish law.
Gomulka was given a well-deserved hero's welcome upon his
return to Warsaw, but world attention was diverted from the
Russo-Polish situation by the explosive events in Hungary.
5 New York Times , Nov 19, 1956.
53Facts on File , Vol XVI , No. 838, Nov 14 - Nov 20, 1956,
pp. 388-389. (A copy of the "Polish-Soviet Agreement on the




The apparent thaw following the Polish October, however,
was marred by several chilling events which indicated that,
from a Soviet viewpoint, the relationship with the Poles was
an uneasy one. Within three days after Gomulka's return
from Moscow for example, Poland, for the first time ever,
failed to vote with the Soviet Union on a United Nations
54
resolution. Even more disquieting, however, were Polish
demonstrations that occurred in Warsaw in sympathy for the
plight of the Hungarians. For some two hours on the evening
of 24 October, thousands of youths marched around the center
of Warsaw shouting anti-Soviet slogans and calling for
Rokossovsky 's recall to Moscow. Even a traditionally for-
bidden subject surfaced as demonstrators rhythmically chanted,
"Xatyn — Katyn — Katyn!" recalling the massacre of from
10,000 to 12,000 Polish army officers by the Soviets during
World War II. Then on the following day, crowds of Poles
attacked a Soviet army installation at Liegnitz and had to be
repelled by Polish militia units with tear gas. A few weeks
later (December 10, 1956) an apparently isolated event, the
arrest of a drunken man in Stettlin and subsequent complaints
54
New York Times , Nov 22, 1956. This UN resolution was to
allow observers to determine conditions in Hungary following
the Soviet invasion. The asst to the Sec. General, when
reading the roll call, after "Poland," said "No!" — apparently
automatically. The Polish delegation waved their hands
excitedly with apparent delight, insisting their vote was
"abstention.
"
55New York Times , Oct 24, 1956.
56Current History, Vol. 31, No. 184, Dec 1956, pp. 376-377.
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by the man's friends, led to the outbreak of still another
little-publicized riot that again soon developed into an
expression of anti-Soviet sentiment. The Soviet consulate
was raided by a mob. Windows were smashed and attempts were
made to break in before Polish police managed to quell the
57disturbance and disperse the crowds. Later it was learned
that many of the rioters actually did enter the consulate
wrecking the interior, threatening employees, and looting its
contents. The Polish government, of course, officially apolo-
58gized to the Soviet Union. The year 1956, not exactly a
great year for Soviet-East European relations, came to a close
with a blazing verbal attack in Pravda against parties who
placed nationalism above unity with the Communist world, and
a warning to the Poles not to raise nationalist goals too
high, reminding them of Lenin's attack on "narrow-minded
59
nationalism" and "nationalistic distortions."
Nevertheless, Poland under the leadership of Gomulka
appeared to be well on its way to a fairly independent path
toward Socialism. In addition to the concessions won from
the Soviets, within Poland itself the rule of terror was
largely curbed, persecution of the Catholic Church ended, and
collectivization of agriculture was abandoned. But while
these reforms were welcome, they proved to be less than
57New York Times, Dec 12, 1956
58New York Times, Dec 13, 1956
59New York Times, Dec 24, 1956
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enough, and in the long run, they fell far short of popular
60
expectations. Heavy restrictions were gradually re-imposed
on intellectual freedom; anticipated economic reforms were
not carried out; and in the area of foreign affairs, Poland
once again fell in step with the Soviet Union. Erwin Weit,
Gomulka's personal interpreter for many years, says that
"...the tragedy of Gomulka was that once he had gained power
and had made the initial changes from the hated system of
6 1
the past, he began to back-pedal." Milovan Djilas had this
to say about Gomulka:
"Poland and the whole world changed, but Gomulka did
not. His modesty and conciliatoriness
,
partyminded-
ness and patriotism were transformed into obstinancy
and a peremptory manner, into bureaucratism and
pedantry. There are few historical figures who began
so courageously and ended so disgracefully. Gomulka
has no complaint that history did not give him a
chance. " 62
Gomulka, in short, disappointed the hopes of his most stead-
fast supporters and became isolated from the sentiments of
the Polish people. Throughout the 1960s this disillusionment
turned more and more frequently into defiance and on several
occasions erupted into the open.
Gomulka's leadership was challenged by two factions
within the Party itself. One was led by Edward Gierek, the
60Adam Bromke, "Beyond the Gomulka Era," Foreign Affairs ,
April, 1971.
Erwin Weit, At the Red Summit: Interpreter Behind the
Iron Curtain (New York: MacMillan, 1970), pp. 4-5.
62Milovan Djilas, in Kultura (Paris) No. 3, 1971. Trans-
lation in A. Ross Johnson's "Polish Perspectives, Past and
Present," Problems of Communism, Vol. XX, Jul-Aug 1971.
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influential first secretary of the industrially powerful
Katowice Province, and the other, known as the Partisans,"
was led by former Gomulka supporter, General Mieczyslaw
Moczar, who as Minister of Internal Affairs, controlled the
6 3
system of state security. Ultimately, it would be a
coalition of these groups that would fill the vacuum left
by Gomulka 's departure in 1970.
The year 19 68 marked something of a turning point in
Polish politics, and clearly signalled the beginning of the
end for Gomulka. In February and March, dissatisfaction
burst into the open once again as thousands of Warsaw students
took to the streets to participate in sit-in strikes and
64demonstrations in protest over cultural censorship.
Although Gomulka survived the crisis and was re-elected First
Secretary in November, internal Party conflict was further
intensified against a backdrop of intellectual repression,
anti-semitism, economic sluggishness, and a general feeling
65
of despair and depression. The events of 19 70 might not
have been necessary to bring Gomulka' s house of cards tumbling,
had it not been for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.
6 3
Bromke, "Beyond the Gomulka Era," p. 401.
64For an excellent journalistic description of the spring
riots in Poland, see, in order, Stephen Rosenfeld, "Polish
Writers Attack Regime's Cultural Policy," Washington Post ,
Mar 2, 1968; Jonathon Randal, "Polish Students in Second Day
of Riots," and "Thousands in Poland Fight Police as Protest
Mounts," New York Times , Mar 10 and Mar 12, 19 68.
Jonathon Randal, "Power Struggle Persists Among Polish
Communists," New York Times, Oct 31, 1968.
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Gomulka had been defending his position on the grounds that he
had to walk a thin line between national liberalism and inter-
national subservience to the Soviet Union. Poland's geographi-
cal position, sandwiched between the Soviet Union and Germany,
forced him to retain Moscow's favor in order to avoid a deal
between his two neighbors at Poland's expense, specifically
the restoration of that area of Western Poland that was once
6 6
Germany. Even as early as 19 57, while still at the height
of his political strength and domestic popularity, Gomulka
indicated his awareness of the need for caution with regard
to the Soviet Union, and even then he warned that "to cross
out Communist candidates (in the coming election) is to cross
67
out Poland from the map of European states. Then in 1968,
in a speech delivered at a shipbuilders' festival in Gdansk
(which appeared in Pravda only two days later) , he gave ample
notice that he fully supported the "solidarity and fraternal
cooperation with our mighty neighbor the Soviet Union... on
6 8
the basis of internationalism..." Certainly by 1968 his
position was extremely precarious. In an ex post facto ad-
mission of his own:
"If there had been no intervention in Czechoslovakia I
would have lost the last vestiges of power and authority
6 fi
Erwin Weit, Red Summit, p. 5.
67Current History, Vol. 32, No. 187, Mar 1957, p. 189.
Wladyslaw Gomulka, "The Rout of the Counterrevolution,"
speech in Gdansk, Jun 28, 1958, Pravda, Jun 30, 1958, trans-
lation in Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol. X, No. 26.
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in Poland. The situation was so tense that I literally
counted the days.... If the Soviet comrades decided to
solve this problem another way, people would conclude
that Gomulka ' s opinion no longer carried any weight.
And this really was a period when my position was by
no means stable. "69
The Soviet rape of Czechozlovakia was to grant Gomulka only
a temporary lease on his political life.
69
"The Reminiscences of Wladyslaw Gomulka," Radio
Liberty Research, No. 50, 1974, p. 15.
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V. GDANSK AND THE FALL OF GOMULKA
A. POLAND, 1970: A FIRST LOOK
One of the greatest problems confronting the Gomulka
regime during 19 70 was the continued deterioration of Poland's
economic situation. Two consecutive poor crop years resulted
in a substantial decline in farm production, including a fall
in grain harvest by four million tons, and a reduction in the
pig population by 14 percent. And, due to under- investment
in agriculture and a shortage of fertilizer, Poland had to
import millions of tons of grain from the Soviet Union,
France, West Germany, and Canada. Agricultural exports,
which largely financed the modernization of and investment
70in industry, had to be drastically cut. In the face of
these problems, the regime proved incapable of effective
economic management. This is not surprising — nor can all
of the blame be charged to Gomulka. Innovative economic
management of the type needed by Poland in 19 70, is not the
forte of a centrally controlled Communist regime bound by
ideological conservatism. As Peter Drucker , one of the
world's leading authorities on management, points out, be-
cause of the absence of a realistic pluralism of competing
institutions, "...such a regime does produce goods and
70
The Annual Register (London: Longman, 1971), p. 118.
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services , though only fitfully, wastefully, at a low level,
and at an enormous cost in suffering, humiliation, and
frustration.
"
By the early part of 1970, industrial workers began to
add their voices to the mounting dissatisfaction with the
worsening economic situation, and severe food shortages led
to minor disturbances in southern Poland. It must be pointed
out that while it is one thing for a Communist regime to
neutralize or even suppress intellectual, religious, or stu-
dent dissent, it is quite another to cope with serious worker
unrest. Demonstrations, strikes and violence of workers
directed at a Party claiming to have the workers ' interests
at heart, represents a threat to the very foundation of that
Party's authority and legitimacy. (The moral pronouncements
and ideological charges of Solzhenitsyn, the writer, for
example, do not carry quite the same impact as the burning
and pillaging of Smygelski, the dockworker.)
71Peter F. Drucker, Management (New York: Harper & Row,
1973) , p. x. Even the Poles recognized the economic stagna-
tion that plagued the Gomulka regime of 19 70. K. T. Toeplitz,
a Polish commentator writing in Zycie Warsawy , Jul 22, 1970,
made the following observation: "...the amount of energy
expended on and, even worse, the hopes attached to organiza-
tions are small. Why? I think it is because their activities
have been largely formalized, subjected to a single model,
and hence somehow bureaucratized. As a result, many organi-
zations have lost their character as initiative groups, as
characteristically socialist 'pressure groups' seeking the
realization of their demands... It often seems that many of
the conduits .. .are blocked, buried under a mountain of paper,
devoid of independence or effectiveness."
42

Then in December, the government committed a monumental
blunder by adding the proverbial last straw. In order to
avoid losing foreign exchange by diverting meat production
intended to export to domestic consumption, the decision was
made to curtail demand by increasing prices. The increases
were from 11% to 33% for meat and meat products, 8% to 25%
for cheese, flour, fish, and milk, and 92% for wheat (ersatz)
72
coffee, constituting over 70% of an average family budget.
To make matters worse, the increases were to go into effect
only days before Christmas in a traditionally religious
nation where the birth of Jesus is celebrated with gluttonous
enthusiasm, in which even the poorest family sits down to a
nine-course "Vigil Dinner" on Christmas Eve.
The announcement came on 13 December, only one day after
shipyard workers in Gdansk were demanding revision of a new
wage incentive system which was to take effect in 19 71, be-
lieved to be aimed at a reduction in take-home pay
December, the day following the price increase announcement,
the Gdansk workers laid down their tools and took to the
streets. Polish militia intervened and the demonstration
appeared to be quickly broken. Early the next morning (15
December) however, the workers were joined by students and
housewives, and this time when the militia intervened, the
demonstrations escalated into pitched battles during which
several public buildings, notably the Party headquarters,
. On 14 \
.




were set on fire. During the next two days, rioting spread
to neighboring towns of Sopot, Slupsk, Gdynia, Elblay and
Szczecin. Violence in Szczecin reached such a point that
the city Strike Committee was in fact running the city for
a few days. Regular military tank and armor units inter-
vened on 18 December, and troops occupied key points sealing
off the entire coastal area. Foreign eye-witnesses arriving
in Sweden and Denmark reported bloody clashes between civili-
ans and troops, and told of hundreds of casualties. Polish
radio broadcasts monitored in West Germany carried news of
the clashes as early as the evening of 15 December, and
largely confirmed eye-witness reports.
Then on 19 December, Radio Warsaw reported a state of
calm and order returning with only partial strikes continuing,
and on 20 December, only days after the outbreak began, the
New York Times carried the headlines, " Gomulka Quits in Wake
of Poland's Price Riots; Gierek New Party Chief," A few days
later the Polish Sejm (parliament) accepted the resignation
of Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz , and ordered food prices frozen
for two years (except for seasonal fluctuations) . That same
session ratified several other governmental appointments in
an apparently honest attempt to revitalize the nation's
73
economy. Edward Gierek, the new Party chief, took immediate
steps to appease the workers by pledging to partially restore
This account of the 1970 food price riots in Poland
has been pieced together from reports that appeared in the
New York Times , Dec 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, & 21, 1970; the
London Times , Dec 17, 18, 19, 20, & 21, 1970; Facts on File ,
Vol XXX, No. 1573, Dec 17-23, 1970, pp. 929-930; and The
Annual Register , 1970 (London: Longman, 1971), pp. 113-121.
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the earning power of lower income groups and abandoning
the proposed wage system. Despite these concessions and
changes in leadership, however, worker unrest continued through
January 1971, when additional work stoppages took place, and
early in February some 10,000 textile workers went on strike.
Gierek was bailed out by the Soviet Union however, who granted
the considerable credit of some 100-million dollars — enough
to enable him to revoke the increases that had sparked the
December riots, and on the following day, the strikers returned
to their jobs. By the middle of 1971, the internal crisis
had largely passed and the Polish economy was on the way to
recovery
.
The events as unfolded above suggest clearly that the
cause of Gomulka's demise as party leader was his regime's
inability to cope with the serious economic straits that con-
fronted Poland in 1970. Economic reform was indeed necessary
for the Polish economy to work, and price increases were an
inevitable aspect of that reform. But the increases in con-
sumer staples were too drastic to be acceptable to the Polish
worker, and the timing of those increases could not have been
worse.
The answer to the question, why did the Soviet Union
choose to show so much restraint during the 19 70 crisis, is
a bit more difficult. It is known that Gomulka had back-
pedaled his way into a "neo-Muscovite" position and became a
faithful follower of policies established by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. Why then didn't his powerful
45

sponsor step in to lend support during his hour of need? A
cursory analysis might suggest the following. First, the
Poles acted quickly to solve their own internal crisis, and
it was only a matter of days from the onset of the riots to
Gierek's emergence as First Secretary — a move that appeared
acceptable to all factions in the PUWP leadership. Second,
the Soviets were undoubtedly aware of Polish economic prob-
lems, and Gierek was a logical choice to deal with them.
He had built up a reputation in Silesia, (Poland's most
industrialized province) not as a "reformer" but as a capable,
74pragmatic manager cut from the mold of the modern technocrat.
And finally, it should not be overlooked that Gomulka repor-
tedly suffered a nervous collapse on the first or second day
of the riots. Gomulka did in fact issue an appeal for help
to Brezhnev (the contents of which is not known) but only
75
after he was hospitalized or confined to house rest. Thus,
whether Gomulka 's illness was of the physical or the politi-
cal variety, Soviet intervention would have been in support
of a "sick" client.
B. POLAND, 1970: A SECOND LOOK
Just as in 1956, if the events of 1970 which led to
Gomulka 's downfall are analyzed from a Soviet perspective,
they begin once again to reflect the tangled skein of Polish,
indeed, Communist politics.
David Bonavia, special to the London Times , Dec 22, 1970
75Leopold Labedz, "From Poznan to Gdansk," Interplay ,
Vol. 4, No. 3, Mar 1971, pp. 21-26.
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The economic conditions in Poland discussed above were
undoubtedly known to the Soviets and probably accepted as
the immediate cause of the December riots. The Soviets
are well attuned to the problems of economics which beset
virtually all Communist nations. They were in fact contem-
plating their own price increases to alleviate some of their
own economic woes. According to Dimitri Simes, Director of
Soviet Policy Studies at Georgetown University , Soviet
grocery stores had already received new price lists when the
7 6
whole plan was cancelled as a result of the Polish example.
There are a few aspects however, that might have been
perceived differently in Moscow. The most serious of these
was that the timing of the announced price increases appeared
to be more than a mere blunder, — indeed, bordered on the
brink of an outright provocation. This was speculated by one
77
Communist source as early as 17 December 19 70. Therefore
even though the price rises may have been the final straw,
the much more basic cause of the crisis in Poland which
brought Gomulka down, was a factional struggle in the Polish
Politburo. This struggle had been going on since the after-
math of the 1956 Poznan riots, and had crescendoed by 1968
as described earlier.
It is significant that the leaders of the two factions
opposed to Gomulka, Gierek and Moczar, were both absent from
76Dimitri Simes, in a letter to the author, Mar 2, 1977.
Simes, a soviet emigre, was in Moscow during the 1970 riots.
77New York Times , Dec 18, 1970. For additional ideas
along these lines, see also the London Times , Dec 17, 1970.
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the Politburo meetings of December 10th through the 14th.
More importantly, neither of them was in attendance at the
Sixth Party Plenum which met on 14 December when the fateful
78decision to announce the price increases was made. Could
this have been a move to avoid blame for that decision?
Originally planned for late January 1971, it is not quite
clear how the decision to proceed early was reached, but such
are the strange ways of political intrigue. Leopold Labedz,
editor of Survey (London) , thinks that it may have been
prompted by information fed to Gomulka by the security police
(under Moczar) that led him to believe that the risk of seri-
79
ous reaction to the increases was small. There can be
little doubt, however, that the Natolin and Partisan factions
had formed a coalition that developed into a conspiracy against
Gomulka. The day after Gomulka reportedly suffered a nervous
collapse (Dec 17, 1970), security police units surrounded his
villa, isolating him from his supporters. The following day,
a special meeting of the Politburo took place in Natolin under
the chairmanship of Gierek, and on 20 December an Extraordinary
Plenum of the Central Committee endorsed several changes in
the composition of the leadership. Gierek succeeded Gomulka,
80
who resigned for reasons of ill health, and to add further
78
Labedz, Interplay , p. 23.
79 Ibid.
New York Times , Dec 21, 1970. A medical communique
signed by the Minister of Health, Jan Kostrzewski, said that
Gomulka had been suffering from circulatory ailments, causing
temporary disturbance of sight, and that he was hospitalized
on December 19, 1970.
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V
credence to the theory of a Natolinist-Partisan conspiracy,
81Moczar was elevated to full membership in the Politburo.
An indication that the army may have been involved in the
conspiracy is the fact that Wojcieck Jaruzelski, Poland's
Minister of Defense, became the first professional military
82
officer to be chosen a candidate member of the Politburo.
There were three necessary elements in the removal of
Gomulka. First, a coalition of rival factions developed
into a conspiracy determined to replace Gomulka and his key
supporters; second, the economic conditions that created a
climate in which violent reaction to the regime could occur;
and third, the necessary spark to set off that violence at
the right moment.
It is possible that the Soviets were aware of the plan
from the very start, but it is more probable, as Myron Rush
points out, that they were informed only after the coup had
83
succeeded — that is, when Gomulka was forced to resign.
There were reports of large Soviet, East German, and Czechos-
lovakian troop movements during the rioting, but these were
probably only precautionary moves in case the violence spread
84dangerously — especially to areas outside Poland. A rather
8
1
New York Times , Dec 21, 1970 and London Times , Dec 22,
1970.
82
Myron Rush, How Communist States Change Their Rulers
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974) , p. 176.
83 Ibid, p. 179.
8
'New York Times, Dec 20, 1970.
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strong indication that the Gierek succession was met with
acceptance (if not with enthusiasm) by the Soviets was the
release of the Tass communique concerning the Polish Party
Politburo shakeup within one hour after the announcement
was made in Warsaw on 20 December. Furthermore, the Tass
report was an exact re-broadcast of the statement released
85by PAP , the Polish press agency. David Bonavia, news
analyst of the London Times , who was in Moscow at the time
,
viewed this anomaly as a suggestion that the Tass editors
were caught unawares and therefore decided to play it safe by
g c
re-broadcasting the PAP release. A more plausible theory
is that the Polish statement was issued quickly and without
change because it had been previously cleared for release in
Moscow. On the following day, 21 December, Edward Gierek
received official congratulations from Leonid Brezhnev in the
name of the Soviet Union's Central Committee, and from other
leaders of the "fraternal parties." Brezhnev's message con-
tained not the slightest hint of criticism of the way in which
the Polish crisis had been handled, and expressed confidence
in the new leadership's ability to solve its problems. It
New York Times , Dec 21, 1970. For the complete text of
the PAP communique as released in Moscow, see Pravda, Dec 21,
1970, p. 1, translation in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press, Vol. XXII, No. 51, Jan 19, 1971, p. 6.
86David Bonavia, "Shock and Surprise in Moscow," London
Times, Dec 21, 1970.
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read, in part, "Our Party and the Soviet people know you well
as a prominent Party leader and statesman of peoples 1 Poland,
a sincere friend of the Soviet Union (and) a staunch Communist-
internationalist." Even Ulbricht, East Germany's "Prussian
Stalin," known for his miserly treatment of fraternal compli-
ments, saw fit to bestow upon Gierek, "the most cordial wishes
for good luck," and referred to "our firm fraternal affinity
8 7
with Poland and its Marxist-Leninist party." Only Peking
failed to immediately mention the changes in Poland's leader-
ship, and later were accused in a Pravda editorial of taking
a position "indistinguishable" from the speculations, fact-
juggling and deliberate falsehoods that imperialists propa-
88ganda has resorted to."
The above analysis of the events as they developed in
December 1970, should also suggest the answer to why the
Soviets did not intervene militarily. Unlike 1956, the cen-
tral issue was not that the Soviets were convinced of Polish
resistance (although that could have soon become the central
issue if the Soviets, for whatever reason, had decided to
actively oppose the Gierek-Moczar conspiracy) , but whether
or not the Poles appeared able to control the situation. The
relative speed and resolve with which this was accomplished
left little doubt that Gomulka's opponents were comfortably
in command.
87London Times , Dec 22, 1970.
88Pravda , Dec 31, 1970, p. 5, translation in The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press , Vol. XXII, Jan 26, 1970, pp. 1-2
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VI. POLAND UNDER GIEREK, 1971-1976
In the months following the removal of Gomulka, the tempo-
rary alliance between Poland's opposing factions came to an
abrupt end and Party rivalry soon developed into another
full-fledged power struggle. Gierek's position however, was
complicated by persistent economic conditions which, while
instrumental in his successful bid for power, suddenly became
his responsibility to cope with. Resolution of the key dom-
estic problems of economic reform would be largely dependent
on the degree of change that would prove acceptable to or at
least tolerated by the Soviet Union. As Adam Bromke correctly
pointed out, "Gierek had to carry out his policies in Poland
with one eye on Moscow. Heightened Soviet sensitivity to
political changes in the Communist nations of Eastern Europe,
especially in the aftermath of the events of 1968 in Czechos-
89
lovakia was doubtless a factor that Gierek could not ignore."
Gierek's immediate steps to reform the Polish economy were
covered in general in section V, above. More specifically,
a combination of measures were introduced, designed to compen-
sate low-income families by increasing the minimum wage,
granting a graduated raise for families earning more than the
minimum, and providing family allowances for families with two
or more children. Pensions and disability payments were also
89Adam Bromke, "Poland Under Gierek: A New Political




raised and housing construction was accelerated. As was
also pointed out however, these measures fell short of their
intended goals and it took a three-day strike in Szczecin in
January and a general strike of some 10/000 textile workers
in Lodz before the Gierek leadership was finally forced into
an across-the-board revocation of the December price increases
This was made possible by a large Soviet credit. (Interest-
ingly enough, Lodz, Poland's largest textile center, holds
a special place in the tradition of worker unrest not only in
Poland, but in Russia as well, to whom Lodz belonged until
1918. The Revolution of 1905 in Russia was highlighted by a
general strike in Lodz, which had to be bloodily suppressed
91by Tsarist troops after some five days of street fighting. )
With the immediate causes of worker dissatisfaction removed,
the Gierek regime then turned to a meaningful solution to
Poland's long-term economic woes — the need for reform in
agricultural policy. A comprehensive reform program was
announced in April 1971, to go into effect the following
January. The outdated and unpopular system of compulsory
deliveries of livestock, grain, and potatoes to the state was
Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw) , Jan 1, 1971. Joint announcement
of the Council of Ministers and the Central Council of Trade
Unions. See also Gierek 's speech to the CC Plenum, Feb 8,
1971. References cited in "A New Economic Approach," by
Michael Gamarnikov, Problems in Communism , Sep-Oct 1972, p. 22.
Basil Dmytryshyn, USSR, A Concise History (New York:
Scribners, 1965)
,
p. 31. See also Hugh Seton-Watson, The





abolished; changes were made in property laws in favor of
the individual farmer; the system of land taxes was modern-
ized; and health services and other benefits were extended
92to farmers and their families. More important than the
reform measures themselves however, was the more fundamental
rationale behind the new economic policy, reflecting a prag-
matic, consumer-oriented approach designed to improve the
material well-being of the population at large. Highly
unusual (in a socialist state) , this basic concept was suc-
cinctly expressed by one Polish writer in the following terms;
"The new socio-economic policy is based on the assumption
that it is already possible for the present generation to
benefit from the economic progress of Poland. .. .The crux
of the problem is, while not ignoring economic growth, to
attain the maximum possible standard of living. In short,
the objective is to promote parallel social and economic
development of the country. "93
Inherent in this concept was the belief that increased con-
sumption is a desirable factor. Jan Szydlak, one of Gierek's
lieutenants and new Politburo member, made this point clear
in a speech delivered in Katowice during the fall of 1971.
He said, "...increased consumption is an important and neces-
sary factor in the process of economic growth, a factor which
stimulates production and technological progress, improves
94
organization, and results in greater labor productivity."
Q O
Michael Gamarnikov, "A New Economic Approach," Problems
of Communism , Vol. XXI, Sep-Oct 1972, pp. 20-22.
Natalia Swidzinska, Polska lat Siedemdziesiatych , (Poland
in the Seventies) (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1972) , p. 8, cited
in Bromke, "Poland Under Gierek," p. 8.
94Jan Szydlak, speech delivered in Katowice, Trybuna
Ludu (Warsaw), Oct 14, 1971.
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But even while dealing with the country's economic crisis,
Gierek was forced to simultaneously wage a power struggle
that proved him to be as politically ruthless as he was known
to be " technocratically efficient." Most of Gomulka's sup-
porters had been removed from leadership positions by the end
of 1970, but Gierek soon realized (if indeed he ever had any
doubt) that he faced a new challenge from the Partisans led
by Mieczyslaw Moczar who had been elevated to Politburo mem-
bership as a reward for his collaboration in the temporary
alliance against Gomulka. As early as February, 1971, the
Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy was reporting "an acute struggle
95
...between the old and the new at many levels" in Poland.
By spring of 1971, Gierek, in a move to establish his position
of undisputed leader, began his move against Moczar. Almost
immediately upon return from a trip to Moscow, Gierek relieved
Moczar of his secretariat duties in charge of security, re-
placing him with a trusted follower, Stanislaw Kania. This
move was facilitated by popular distaste of Moczar following
the appearance in January 1971 of a document attributed to
Gdynia shipyard workers. The document, in the form of a leaf-
let and distributed widely throughout Poland, accused Moczar
96
of using brutality to suppress the December riots. Moczar
95 Zycie Warszawy , Feb 19, 1971. Cited in Bromke, "Poland
Under Gierek.
"
96New York Times , Jan 28, 19 71. This document, titled
"Bloody Thursday in Gdynia," contained graphic descriptions
of the alleged brutality, referring to such emotional scenes
as dipping the Polish flag in the blood of a young boy slain





resigned from the secretariat altogether, and Kaniz launched
a massive purge of the security apparatus. During 19 71, more
than 10,000 members were expelled from the Party and some




In a move designed to speed up the consolidation of power
process, the February Plenum of the Central Committee decided
to convene the Sixth Congress of the PZPR a full year ahead
of schedule. Convened in Warsaw in December 1971, the Congress
elected a new 115-member Central Committee, of whom only 4 5
had been full members of the previous one. The new Central
Committee elected a new Politburo and Secretariat of eleven
members each, only seven of whom had served previously, and
none of these had served prior to 1968. Gierek, who had been
in the Politburo since 19 59 and in the Central Committee
since 1954, clearly emerged from this rejuvenation as the top
98figure in Poland's power elite.
The explosive events of 1970 in Poland, — the conspiracy
against Gomulka, the riots, and the renewed power struggle
following Gomulka 's downfall, often overshadow another very
important event in Soviet-Polish relations — the Polish-West
German treaty of December 1970. Preliminary talks began in
q 7
This brief account of the 1971 political changes is
integrated from A. Ross Johnson's "Polish Perspectives, Past
and Present," Problems of Communism , Vol. XX, Jul-Aug 1971,




Warsaw in February, and six rounds at the foreign minister
level were held through November. Largely a result of West
German Chancellor Willy Brandt's policy of "Ostpolitik, " an
agreement was signed only days before Gomulka was forced to
step down, but neither side had ratified the pact, and the
Bonn government was obviously alarmed that nearly a year of
99
concerted diplomacy might have been to no avail. Bonn's
fears were soon allayed however, when Waclaw Piatowski, chief
Polish delegate to West Germany, told the West German Foreign
Ministry on 23 December that the new leadership in Warsaw
had decided to proceed with the ratification. The treaty,
signed under Gomulka' s leadership and ratified under Gierek's,
gave de-facto recognition by the Federal Republic of Germany
to Poland's post-war frontier on the Oder-Neisse Rivers.
For twenty-five years since World War II, the Soviet Union
was the sole guarantor of Poland's new western frontier. The
real significance of the treaty for Soviet-Polish relations
then, was that it removed the one profound justification for
Polish alliance with the Soviet Union. As J. F. Brown put
it in a RAND report on relations between the Soviet Union
and East European nations:
"Once the western frontier was recognized by Bonn, each
partner to the alliance , Moscow and Warsaw, had a new
problem on its hands. The Polish leadership's problem
99New York Times , May 10, 11, & 25, and Dec 21, 1970.
100London Times , Dec 24, 1970.
101An English translation of the treaty, provided to the
author by the Bonn Government, appears in Appendix B.
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was to check, distract, or even sublimate the nation's
instinctive, cultural, traditional, religious gravita-
tion to the West. For the Soviets, the. . .situation
now seemed to dictate the even stronger necessity to
bind Poland more closely to the East, through integrating
it more closely into the Soviet-dominated. . .system of
alliances and, at the domestic levels, to mitigate the
role of those institutions and systems — notably the
Roman Catholic Church and the private peasantry —
which seriously impede the ruling party's monoply of
power. "102
It is the humble judgment of this author that the Polish
leadership has been no more able (if indeed they are willing)
to check, distract, or sublimate Poland's gravitation to the
West, than has the Kremlin leadership been able to mitigate
the role of those institutions which tend to impede the mono-
lithic power of the Communist Party in Poland.
J. F. Brown, "Relations Between the Soviet Union and





The most recent outbreaks of violence and workers ' pro-
test in Poland occurred less than a year ago (June, 1976).
Analysis of the 1976 riots will also be conducted from the
vantage of two separate frames of reference. It must be
pointed out however, that the events of 1976 were relatively
minor when compared with the previous crises and the ques-
tion of Soviet intervention does not loom particularly large
A more reasonable question therefore, is how or why were the
worker demonstrations and protests allowed to succeed? Even
short of active Soviet involvement, the Polish leadership
might have taken considerably more stringent measures of its
own to suppress the protests and impose its will. Again,
different frames of reference will suggest different answers
The first perspective will concentrate largely on the
economic determinants of the problem, while the second will
attempt to focus on political determinants and their
implications
.
A. POLAND, 1976: A FIRST LOOK
Once he had consolidated his political position and suc-
cessfully managed Poland's short-term economic problems,
Edward Gierek moved ahead throughout the first half of the
1970 's with a crash program to create a stronger industrial
base. This was accomplished largely through an expansion
of economic relations with the West made possible by the
general climate of East-West detente. Growth was stimulated
59

and technology modernized through Western imports, much of
which was financed by extensive credits. The oil crisis of
1973-1974 led to drastic increases in the price of Soviet
oil, further adding to Poland's growing deficit. Mean-
while, however, Poland's domestic economic situation improved
considerably. National income increased by an impressive
60% during the 1971-1975 Five Year Plan, while industrializa-
tion climbed 70%. Whereas during the Gomulka regime (19 56-
1970) real wages increased a modest 1,8% annually, they aver-
aged a comfortable 8% yearly rise during 19 71-1975 under
Gierek. Production of consumer goods rose by 79% during the
period, and new (Western) products imported from West Germany,
Britain, and the United States began to appear on Polish
markets. Polish hopes were for only a temporary disequilib-
rium in foreign trade until industrial progress made possible
104larger Polish exports to redress the growing imbalance.
The keystone of Gierek 's economic policy for greater indus-
trialization and improved living conditions was expanded
interaction with the West. Inflation and recession in the
West, however, especially since 1974, drove the price of im-
ports to Poland sharply upward, reducing demand for Polish
exports. Several poor crop years slowed down the increase
Clyde Farnsworth, "Polish Price Crisis Reflects
Inflation Ills," New York Times , Jun 29, 1976.
104Thomas E. Heneghan, "Polish Trade and Polish Trends
Economic and Political Considerations," Radio Free Europe
Research, Nov 13, 1975.
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in agricultural production and, when coupled with the rela-
tively high rate of growth in real wages, resulted in serious
shortages of food. " One must remember that throughout
this entire period, largely as a result of the bitter experi-
ences of the attempted price increases in 19 70, prices of
basic foodstuffs remained frozen. The dilemma facing Gierek
was trying to maintain a centralized economy domestically,
while attempting to profitably operate in a free market econ-
omy internationally.
Food shortages began to occur more and more frequently,
and there were labor disturbances among dockworkers in Gdynia
106in the summer of 1974. Later that year, miners in Katowice
demonstrated dissatisfaction, and early in 19 75, frustrated
housewives ransacked and demolished a grocery store in Warsaw,
and had to be placated with promises from Party and Govern-
4- 1 A 107ment leaders
.
The fundamental laws of economics could not be defied
forever, and on 24 June, 1976, Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz
presented new price proposals to the Sejm (Polish parliament)
.
The price increases (nearly 70% for meat products and 40% for
grain) , intended to curtail consumption while stimulating
10 8
production, were to go into effect on 28 June.
105
U.S. News and World Report , Oct 25, 1976.
1 D 6
London Times , Sep 1, 1974, p. 6.
in 7New York Times , Jun 13, 1975, p. 6.
Radio Free Europe Research , Background Report No. 176,
Aug 16, 1976.

News of the proposed price changes was received by Polish
workers in their, by now, traditional fashion — strikes! —
protests! — and demonstrations leading to violence, looting,
and the sacking of Party headquarters! The day following the
public announcement, violence erupted in the cities of Plock,
Radom, and Ursus (a suburb of Warsaw). Unrest was also
reported in other cities including the Baltic ports. Rioting
workers tore up railroad tracks twenty miles outside of
Warsaw, and in Radom (sixty miles south of Warsaw) , demonstra-
tors set fire to the Communist Party headquarters and had to
be dispersed with tear gas. In delayed accounts of the inci-
dents, Polish television reported on 26 June that factories
and shops had been looted, and on 27 June, that food and
liquor stores were looted in Radom. According to official
Polish government sources, which usually tend to drastically
under-estimate casualties or riots, at least seventy-five
109policemen were injured and two demonstrators were killed.
The Polish leadership vividly recalled the somewhat simi-
lar crisis of 1970, and wasted no time demonstrating that
they had learned from past mistakes. During the height of
the June riots, less than twenty- four hours after announcing
the proposed price changes, Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz
1 09 . .
Reports of the June 19 76 food price riots were con-
tained in many individual news services. I have chosen to
rely on the New York Times , Jun 26, 27, & 28, 19 76; Hamburg
DPA (German) , 27 Jun 76, translation in FBIS Daily Report ,
Vol. II, No. 125, 28 Jun 76; and Facts on File , Vol. 36,
No. I860, Jul 3, 1976, p. 482.
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appeared briefly on television to say that all price increases
would be delayed-^pending consultations with the workers."
The unprecedented speed wrth~-^w£^3r~th«—pxij^^ were
abandoned, dramatically testifies to the terror that worker
protests create among Warsaw rulers. The Poles, after all,
according to the internationally acclaimed sociologist, Jan
Szczepanski (University of Lodz) , are possessed with a tradi-
tional inclination toward individualism and anarchy, and
have a natural disdain for law and order. "The years of
foreign rule and the years of underground struggle," he says,
"have accustomed Poles to disregard the law as something
foreign and irrelevant. The overcoming of this attitude is
of crucial importance for the government." Adam Bromke
makes the interesting observation that the latest outbreak
of violence in Poland occurred almost twenty years to the
112date after the Poznan riots of June 28, 1956, representing
two decades of strife between Communist leadership and the
Polish people. "Today," says Bromke, "the Polish people are
in a more assertive mood than ever before, and the present
(1976) confrontation — unless handled with great caution —
113
could evolve into a more acute crisis than those in the past."
11QNew York Times , Jun 28, 1976.




Communism, Vol. XXV, Sep-Oct 19 76, p. 17.




Why were the protests allowed to succeed? Could not the
Polish leadership have used more force to impose its will on
the people? According to the analysts of the New York Times
,
the protests were allowed to succeed primarily because they
represented dissent against "economic" conditions and not
political ones. "Poles," according to the Times, "with the
lowest standard of living in Eastern Europe, want improved
114
economic conditions, not a non-Communist system." The
Soviets, on the other hand, were beset by their own shortages
115in food production ~ (which were relieved through massive
grain imports from North America) , and apparently welcomed
the Poles "solution" to the June riots, ie, withdrawal of the
sharply increased prices and a pledge to search for a more
acceptable plan.
B. POLAND, 19 76: A SECOND LOOK
The conventional wisdom of American thought tends to
overrate, or at least to be overly concerned with economic
and fiscal matters as the critical component of a society.
While this may be a workable approach with regard to the
technologically developed, politically pluralistic, capitalist
nations of the West, it is often overlooked that Communist
nations build their societies (including their economy) around
1 New York Times, Jun 27, 19 76.
115,
'Clyde Farnsworth, "Polish Price Crisis Reflects
Inflation Ills," New York Times, Jun 29, 1976.
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a base of political power. Therefore from a Communist, and
especially a Soviet perspective, a threat to the political
base is perceived as the crucial menace which jeopardizes
the safety and order of a nation.
A "healthy" sign that the Gierek leadership was aware of
the need for political solidarity and continued fraternal
relations with the Soviet Union, was the removal of Franciszek
Szlachcic, Minister of the Interior (security chief) , from
the PUWP Politburo in 1974. Szlachcic, who had earlier helped
Gierek to consolidate his position following the 1970 change-
over, began to adopt liberal tendencies, and by 197 3 was
116
cautiously advocating greater autonomy from the Soviet Union.
Soon after Szlachcic' s dismissal, as if to further reassure
the Soviets that matters were well in hand, Gierek and his
inner circle of faithful followers renewed their "ideological
offensive" in a move toward greater political conformity.
In March 1974, a national conference of ideological activists
was convened in Warsaw during which Politburo member and
Gierek lieutenant, Jan Szydlak, stated the objectives of the
PUWP's offensive. Foremost was that it should "...present
Poland as an integral part of the socialist commonwealth,
inseparably linked by ideology, alliance, and many-sided
cooperation with the USSR." Szydlak also levelled a strong
denounciation of the reactionary core of the Catholic Church
1 Bromke, "A New Juncture in Poland," p. 7
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which he characterized as "the only center of social rightest
* ,,117forces
.
But rather than snuff out political dissent, the ideologi-
cal offensive only served to stir up more ferment in Poland,
and drive it into the open. A petition addressed to the
Minister of Culture, Jozef Tejchma, for example, written by
the famed poet, Antoni Slonimski and signed by some fifteen
well-known writers, scholars, and artists, demanded freedom
of culture, education, and religion for Poles living in the
118Soviet Union. The Catholic Church, under the leadership
of Cardinal Wyszynski, as if to challenge the charges earlier
attributed to Jan Szydlak, transcended the bounds of religious
matters and questioned the Party's claim of Polish-Soviet
solidarity. Wyszynski appealed especially to Polish national-
ism when he said in a 1974 sermon:
"For us, next to God, our first love is Poland. After God
one must above all remain faithful to our Homeland, to
the Polish national culture. . .And if we see slogans advo-
cating love for all the peoples and all the nations, we
do not oppose them; yet above all we demand the right to
live in accordance with the spirit, history, culture, and
language of our own Polish land."H9
In an attempt to put more teeth into his floundering
ideological offensive, Gierek then decided to amend the Con-
stitution in order to "re-affirm" the socialist nature of
Poland. As proposed in December, 1975, the amendments would
117Nowe Drogi , July 1974, cited in Bromke, "New Juncture,"
pp. 9-10.
118Radio Free Europe Research , Dec 20, 1974. News of
Slonimski f s death in a car accident at the age of 81, was
carried in the New York Times , Jul 6, 1976,- p. 28.
Polonia (Chicago), June 6, 1974.
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have declared Poland a "socialist republic" (an obvious
semantical link with the Soviet Union) , stipulated a special
relationship with the Soviet Union ("unshakeable fraternal
bond with the Soviet Union"), assigned a "leading role in
society" to the Party, and made civil rights dependent on
compliance with duties to the state. The proposed amend-
ments met with so much opposition and criticism during the
120
early months of 1976 that the Party was forced to back down.
Foremost among the opposition was a broad spectrum of fifty-
nine intellectuals, led by the highly respected economist,
Professor Edward Lipinski, who invoked the Helsinki declara-
tion in support of their petition ("The Petition of the 59")
121for a broadening of democratic liberties. Cardinal
Wyszysnki denounced the proposed amendments almost immediately,
and still another block vote of protest was indicated by a
second group of some 100 prominent Poles who sent a letter of
complaint to the parliamentary committee in charge of preparing
122the amendments. Some opposition even appeared within
Party cadres when a local Party organization also submitted
123
a report critical of the proposed amendments. The amend-
ments ultimately adopted, with only a single member of Parlia-
ment abstaining, continued to describe Poland as a Peoples'
Republic, and acknowledged a central, but not encompassing
120Facts on File , Vol. 36, No. 1849, Apr 17, 1976, p. 268
121 T , .,Ibid.
122Le Monde , Feb 10, 1976.
123New York Times , Mar 19, 1976.
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role for the Communist Party. The "special relationship"
with the Soviet Union was watered down within the context
124
of Polish cooperation with all nations. Then in response
to Party charges against signatories of the "Petition of the
59/' Professor Lipinski, an elderly but widely respected
veteran Socialist, addressed an open letter to Gierek calling
for pluralistic socialism on the model of the Italian and
French Communists. Even more disturbing to the Soviets,
Lipinski was quite clear with regard to Polish autonomy.
The imposition of the Soviet system has devastated our
social and moral life....We are being compelled to
support Soviet foreign policy unconditionally, and we
have ceased to be an independent element in world poli-
tics. This is often contrary to Polish interests. We
took part in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia,
helping to suppress the process of renewal in that
country at the very time when it was emancipating
itself from Soviet influence. .. .Today there is no more
important goal for Poland than the reassertion of its
sovereignty. Only after regaining political independence
will it be possible to undertake systematic economic
reform and to restructure the political and social
system. "125
Dissident opinion of the intelligentsia, while resolute
in its demands for cultural and social liberalism, usually
takes an intellectual approach and tends to be more theoreti-
cal than pragmatic. Even Lipinski 's open letter to Gierek,
for example, considered to be one of the most forceful docu-
ments of dissident opinion among the intelligentsia, called
124Facts on File , Apr 17, 1976, p. 268.
125Trybuna , No. 23/79, 1976. Cited in Bromke, "New
Juncture in Poland," p. 13. Not to be confused with the
official paper, Trybuna Ludu , Trybuna is an underground




for "reassertion of sovereignty" and "systematic reform,"
measures that might be argued in terms of incremental change,
gradual progress, or in terms of degree. But dissidence of
a much more radical and potentially dangerous nature also
exists in Poland. Just prior to the June 1976 food price
riots, a highly unusual document circulated in Poland in
samizdat form, titled the "Program of the Polish Coalition
for Independence," that took an almost revolutionary (or
counterrevolutionary) approach in its proposal for change in
Poland. Emanating from an organized political group of un-
named members, the document calls for resolute opposition to
Communism, advocating a return to parliamentary democracy
and a partial return to capitalisml It also predicts periods
of crisis and stresses the need for preconceived alternative
plans:
"It is impossible to anticipate when the crisis will
come into the open... it may begin in Poland. We must
be ready for this, and consequently we should be
conscious not only of what we reject, but also of
what we want to accomplish. .. .Opposition must not be
reduced to grumbling and gossiping. We must at all
times be prepared with alternative plans and goals.
This is above all the duty of the Polish intelligentsia,
which historically has been burdened with this respon-
sibility for the spiritual fortunes of our nation. It
is also the task of the most numerous social group,
namely the industrial workers, who command the greatest
power. "126
It is much too soon and there is far too little evidence to
suggest that there was a connection between organized politi-
cal opposition and the food price riots of June, 1976, but
126Glos Polski, (Toronto), May 27-Jun 24, 1976. Cited in
Problems of Communism, Vol. XXV, Sep-Oct 19 76, p. 14.
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certainly Gierek, who himself was able to exploit economic
conditions in 1970 for political gains, is well aware of
the possible implications. This awareness no doubt prompted
the almost immediate response to the demonstrations and
prompt withdrawal of the price increases.
To signal his political solidarity to the Soviets , Gierek
quickly staged a show of Party support for his policies,
and the day following the riots, the Communist Party held
nation-wide rallies condemning the rioting, and radio and
television stations broadcast letters backing Gierek and
127
other Party and Government leaders. This timely demonstra-
tion that Gierek and the Polish leadership were still firmly
in political control of matters in Poland may have helped to
allay Soviet apprehension, but if in fact the Kremlin leaders
ever seriously considered the possibilty of offering "fraternal
assistance to the healthy forces" (which would be difficult
to demonstrate so soon after the event) , they would have been
more effectively deterred by other considerations. The dis-
orders could not have occurred at a worse time, as Soviet
intervention would have certainly wreaked havoc on the Con-
ference of European Communist and Workers' Parties which was
scheduled to open on June 29 (only four days after the riots
12 8
broke out) in the Stadt Berlin Hotel of East Berlin. East
127Facts on File , Vol. 36, No. I860, Jul 3, 1976, p. 482.
128Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), June 30, 1976.
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German newspapers wasted no time in showing concern over the
disorders in Poland , and on the very eve of the conference,
published the Polish Government's retraction of the price
129increases, indicating that the East Germans considered
the matter closed. The general climate of East-West detente
also presents a restraining influence on the Soviets,
especially when considered along with other factors. And
finally, the relatively recent development of so-called
'Eurocommunism" poses yet another inhibiting influence on
_ . . . . ... 130
excessive Soviet intervention.
While the implications and ramifications of Eurocommunism
are very much a matter of current debate, at least one widely
held view is that for East Europeans in general, Eurocommunism
is one more source of political leverage for more independ-
131
ence from Moscow. Interestingly enough, this might well
be considered a mixed blessing by the Polish leadership, as
they themselves have experienced the pressures of Eurocommunist
influence in their own domestic affairs. Following the June
riots in 19 76, for example, and the subsequent charges and
sentences of several workers, one of Poland's leading dissi-
dents, historian Jacek Kuron, sent an open letter to the
Italian Communist Party leader, Enrico Berlinguer, requesting
129
"East Germans Concerned," special to the New York Times ,
Jun 29, 19.76.
130For the most current comprehensive discussion of the
development of "Eurocommunism" in a single periodical to date,
see Problems of Communism, Vol. XXVI, Jan-Feb 19 77, which de-
votes the entire edition to three articles on Eurocommunism
by Devin Devlin, E. Mujal-Leon, and Dimitri Kitsikis.
131Charles Gati , "The Europeanization of Communism,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 55, No. 3, April 1977, pp. 539-553.
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his support on behalf of the jailed workers. The PCI
responded promptly with a message from the Secretariat to
the PUWP expressing "hope that measures tending to show
132moderation and also clemency may be adopted and publicized.
One can only speculate on the effect of this unusual source
of interference in Polish domestic politics, but it is inter-
esting to note that most of the workers that were sentenced
and jailed for particpating in the June riots (including
some whose sentences were for up to ten years) , have since
133been released.
Among Polish dissidents at least, Eurocommunism is
definitely a welcome development. In an interview with one
of Rome's L 'Espresso '
s
reporters, Polish dissident historian
Adam Michnik, one of the leaders of the 19 6 8 student movement
(and currently a promoter of the Committee for the Defense
134
of the Workers ) made it quite clear that he feels inter-
vention by the Italian Communists helped make it "possible
135
to create socialism with a human face in East Europe."
But, it should be pointed out, Michnik holds no false hopes
that Eurocommunism, or for that matter the West in general,
would deter a Soviet determination to intervene in Poland:
1 3?
L'Unita , 30 July 1976, cited in Radio Free Europe
Research, Background Report, No. 176, 16 Aug 1976.
133Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 1977, p. 6.
This committee, which now claims over 10,000
supporters, was formed following police reprisals against
participants in the 1976 riots in Radom and Ursus
.
135
L 'Espresso (Rome), Dec 5, 1976, p. 45, in FBIS,
Daily Report, Vol. II, 29 Dec 76, p. G1-G2.
72

Question: Do you believe that Eurocommunism's present
position could prevent a possible Soviet intervention,
like in Prague?
Answer: In Poland nobody believes in help from the
West, (emphasis mine) ... (Compromises) to which the
government would have to submit would not be the result
of Eurocommunism but of elementary political realism. 136
Nor does there appear to be any doubt in the minds of Ameri-
cans as to where the West in general and the U.S. in particu-
lar stands in relation to Eastern Europe. A 1975 Harris
Poll, for example, reports that only 39 percent of the Ameri-
can public would support the extension of U.S. assistance to
Western Europe if that region were attacked, and only 11 per-
137
cent would favor any defense of Yugoslavia. As recently
as 1970, President Nixon clearly indicated this government's
policy toward Eastern Europe as a function of U.S. -Soviet
relations, when he stated in his annual message to Congress:
"It is not the intention of the United States to under-
mine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet
Union. The time is certainly past... when any power
would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic
advantage against the Soviet Union. It is clearly no
part of our policy ." ^-^°
Ibid.
137John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and
U.S. Foreign Policy 1975 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations, 1975), p. 59.
138Cited in Charles Gati , "The Forgotten Region,"




What does this study of crises in 1956, 1970, and 1976
portend for the future of Poland? Predictions of political
developments are always hazardous — sometimes little more
than guesses. But careful analysis and examination of
developments in Soviet-East European affairs can suggest
several broadly generalized predictions.
The Third Congress of the Polish Institute of Arts and
Sciences in America was held at McGill University in Montreal
139
on May 16, 1975. A panel discussion by distinguished
experts on Poland ensued (chaired by Adam Bromke) , in which
the future of Poland for the next twenty-five years was the
subject at hand. By far the most clearly defined alterna-
tives for the future of Poland were articulated by Zbigniew
Brzezinski, who envisioned four possible developments; (1)
complete independence, (2) relative independence, (3) continued
dependence (on the Soviet Union) , and (4) total absorption
by the Soviet Union as another republic. Brzezinski went on
to say that while present trends seem to favor a condition
of continued dependence, he personally predicts a process of
gradual pluralistic evolution, which will quietly transform
140
Poland into a condition of relative independence. Andrzej
Korbcnski, on the other hand, while he agrees with the
A. Bromke, Z. Brzezinski, Z. Fallenbuchl, A. Gella,
L. Kolakowski, and A. Stypulkowski, "Poland in the Last
Quarter of the Twentieth Century: A Panel Discussion,"





probable development of pluralistic evolution, feels that it
will be combined with technological adaptation.
Both of these conditions imply incremental or evolutionary
change (one explicitly, the other implicitly) and do not take
into account the explosive set-back that could occur a la
Czechoslovakia, 1968, which would act to disrupt, perhaps
even reverse, evolutionary change. That potentially disrup-
tive force has been taken into account here, and incorporated
into the development of the prospects for the future of Poland
Thoughtful reflections on the nature of future develop-
ments in Poland suggest a few general propositions. The
aspirations of the Poles are similar to those of people
throughout Eastern Europe, perhaps the world. Arranged in a
sort of "Mas low's hierarchy of needs" applied to the politi-
cal sphere, they are: more material prosperity, more
personal freedom, and more national independence. All of
these aspirations are "relative" by nature and therefore
quite impossible of being either completely fulfilled or
completely denied in absolute terms. Poland, for example,
has experienced enormous progress in industrialization,
standards of living, and education — in absolute terms.
Indeed, even when compared with the Soviet Union she has
done relatively well. But the Poles, largely due to their
natural gravitation to the West, tend to compare their posi-
tion with that of East Germany, and more recently, even with
Adnrzej Korbonski, "The Prospects for Change in




that of West Germany, with whom ever since the Warsaw-Bonn
Treaty of 1970 she has broadened relations in the political,
cultural and economic sectors. In any such comparison with
her neighbors to the West, the Poles see a long road ahead
for their hope for material prosperity — to say nothing of
their aspirations for personal freedom and national independ-
ence. Therefore it seems safe to predict that the Poles
will attempt to make further progress in each of these areas.
But how far they might go and how successful they might be
will depend on how carefully the Polish leadership can chart
a course of progress that remains within the limits of Soviet
tolerance and acceptability.
A word concerning limits — these are not limits in the
sense of clearly delineated lines, the crossing over of which
is readily apparent to the casual observer. Rather they are
more like the transition from one color to the next in a
rainbow, wherein the "division" between adjacent colors is
indistinct and in fact varies (in perception) from observer
to observer. Furthermore, conditions and events in Poland do
not occur in an international vacuum, or in a "steady state"
of world affairs. Soviet decisions are therefore affected
by a multiplicity of influences and external restraints.
This is to say that a particular development in Poland that
might be totally unacceptable to the Soviets today, may for
any one of a number of reasons , be tolerated at some other
time — and, of course, vice versa.
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Nevertheless it appears that, for the foreseeable future,
there are at least two acts that if committed by the Poles will
result in Soviet military intervention of the type experienced
in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Unless the contemporary world witnesses the disintegration
of the Soviet state, either of the following acts by Poland
will almost certainly result in Soviet military intervention:
1. Dissolution of the Communist Party or its single-
party control of the politics and government of Poland.
2. Any attempt to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, regard-
less of whether or not overtures are made to re-align mili-
tarily with the West.
Hungary, in 1956, serves as the best illustration of the price
to be paid by a Soviet Bloc state that attempts to commit
both of these transgressions. Perpetuation of these acts of
supreme defiance of the Soviet Union must be avoided by the
Polish leadership at all costs if the security of that nation
is to be preserved. But, short of these two extreme and
highly unlikely measures, it is the thesis of this author
that the Polish leadership is capable of taking Poland a long
way down the path of national autonomy and independence from
the Soviet Union. Warsaw's views on international Communism
are probably best expressed in a Novosti article, that appeared
earlier this year in the PUWP's official organ, Trybuna
1^2
Ludu. * While purporting to emphasize international unity,
142Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), Jan 17, 1977, p. 7, in FBIS,
Daily Report, 21 Jan 77, Vol. Ill, pp. A1-A3.
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the article stressed that Communism is now developing on the
national level and that conditions in the individual states
are not the same. Falling back on the ideological justifica-
tion of Lenin's pre-1917 thesis that socialism could not
possibly take the same course in various countries, the
article stated that social progress can best be ensured,
"...if each party preserves its self-dependence and individu-
ally works out the political line in keeping with its own
143
country's socioeconomic situation and national characteristics."
Certainly Gierek or his successor would have to clearly
establish that there would be no breach of military alliance
with the Pact, and ensure the dominance of Communism in Poland.
But within these extreme limits, the Poles would be able to
comfortably operate without fear of Soviet military inter-
vention. Judging from the historical evidence of 1956, 1970,
and 19 76, the Soviets would exercise restraint for the follow-
ing reasons.
1. Assurance that the Poles would put up a ferocious
resistance.
2. Fear that the Chinese might take advantage of Soviet
involvement and pre-occupation in Eastern Europe by hostile
encroachment on Sino-Soviet border areas.
3. Disruption of East-West detente in general and U.S.-




4. Fear of permanently alienating the Western Communist
parties (particularly since 1976)
.
While all of these factors plus the endemic characteristic
of bureaucratic paralysis will act to restrain Soviet mili-
tary intervention in Poland (and a lengthy case might be
made for each of them) , it is the first, the Soviet leader-
ship's firm conviction that the Poles would resist, that
presents the Kremlin with the gravest consequences for any
such decision, and which will here be elaborated on further.
Polish resistance, while it would from a military stand-
point be doomed to inevitable failure (in the long run)
,
would demand the largest Soviet commitment of military force
employed since the Second World War. Appendix C contains
the military order of battle of Poland (see p. 9 5 ) . Even
the casual observer can see that not only would Soviet
divisions stationed in East Germany have to be diverted to
Poland, but a massive assault, on the ground and in the air
(possibly even an amphibious assault from the Baltic) would
have to be mounted from the East as well. Such a huge mili-
tary operation might have grave consequences in the border-
ing republics, especially in the Ukraine and in Lithuania.
In a recent study of the dynamics of Soviet military inter-
vention, one analyst suggested that one of the primary
reasons half-a-million Soviet-led troops were ordered into
action in Czechoslovakia was that the Czechs did not summon
144
their armies and people to the defense of their homeland.
Christopher D. Jones, "Soviet Hegemony in Eastern
Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military
Intervention," World Politics , Jan 1977, pp. 216-241.
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Indeed, a proclamation to the people of Czechoslovakia from
the Presidium of the Central Committee only a few hours after
the Czech borders were violated, called upon "all citizens
of the Republic to keep the peace and not resist the advancing
armies. (Because defense is impossible) our army, the Security
Forces, and the Peoples' Militia were not given the order to
145defend the country." Nothing in the long-established
military tradition of the Poles suggests that the Soviets
would find such an easy time of it on Polish soil as they did
in Czechoslovakia in 19 68.
Of particular importance in the defense of Poland, are
the highly organized and well-equipped Border Guard and
Territorial Defense Force, which number some 80,000 troops.
These special forces differ from traditional home defense
units in that they are equipped with a full weapons comple-
146
ment, including tanks and APCs . It is highly probable
that they would serve as elite cadre that would augment their
units from the 350,000-man Citizens' Militia. One can recall
that an underground Polish army of only some 40,000 poorly-
equipped troops (supported by Warsaw civilians) managed to
Robert Littell, ed., The Czech Black Book , (New
York: Praeger 1969) , p. 11. Prepared by the Institute
of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, trans-
lated by Praeger.
John Erickson, Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels ,
(Washington: U.S. Strategic Institute, 1976) , pp. 83-84.
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hold-off joint attacks by five well-equipped German divisions
for sixty-three days during the 1944 Battle of Warsaw.
Does not the existence of a similarly-motivated (and better
equipped) force of nearly half-a-million give the Soviets
serious pause for thought? David Vital, in his seminal
14 8
study of The Survival of Small States , makes an excellent
case for the proposition that the more single-minded a minor
power is in its determination to resist, the greater are the
costs to a major power who contemplates aggression. Given
the Soviets 1 historical penchant for caution and conservatism
with regard to direct military involvement, such a bold and
potentially costly venture would be entered into if, and
only if, one of the two suicidal measures mentioned above
were taken by the Poles, ie, the overthrow of Communism or
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.
But to say that Gierek's regime (or his successor's)
could pull off nearly a "Finlandization" of their state within
the limits described above, is not to say that they will —
or even that it would be in their best interests to do so.
Poland under Gierek has tasted the somewhat bitter
fruit of increased economic relations with the West, and
while significant progress has indeed been made toward
Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows , (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1975), pp. 423-424.
148David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies
in Small Power-Great Power Conflict , (London: Oxford
University Press, 1971), p. 124.
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economic development and industrialization, Poland is not
likely to favorably compete in the world market for some
time to come. For the next decade at least, and possibly
through the end of the century, Poland will remain inextric-
ably linked to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc for her
economic well-being. Countless examples of this proposition
can be used for illustration, from Poland's growing concern
with energy resources to her need for markets for (low
quality) manufactured goods, but the point is that any suc-
cesful Polish regime is likely to develop (as indeed Gierek
has gone a long way toward developing) what the Germans would
call a "Wirtschafts-kombinat" between the State, the Party,
and the Polish society. Such a combine will be dependent
upon the continuation of membership in a system (the Social-
ist system of the Soviet Bloc) which is conducive to central-
ized economic controls and one in which economic integration
such as the coordinated production and distribution of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is likely to
favor the continued development of a Poland that represents
a valuable link to the West. Poland has already reached a
rather high state of technocratic adaptation in its approach
to productivity and modernization, but not sufficiently high
to favorably compete in the world market system of the West.
The degree to which Poland moves toward a state of plural-
ism and broader political participation, is not dependent
upon restraints imposed by the Soviet Union (with the caveat
that Communism must be preserved) , but rather a function of
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influences within Polish society and the willingness of the
Party leadership to relinquish some of its oligraphic power.
This voluntary relinquishment of power is not an inherent
characteristic of any ruling elite, Communist or non-Commun-
ist, but will likely result from a desire for increased
legitimacy — a condition necessary if that regime is to
respond to the flexible conditions of technocratic demands
in a modern state. Edward Gierek has demonstrated an unusu-
ally high degree of willingness to seek that element of
legitimacy „ Once initiated, the process of liberalization
(economic, social, or political) is extremely difficult to
halt. The evolutionary process of limited pluralism and
broader participation in Poland has developed its own inertia
and is likely to continue undaunted toward a process of "near-
Finlandization. " Witness, for example, the matter of govern-
ment sponsored emigration. Whereas in East Germany only a
few thousand (mostly those of the elderly and infirm) of the
estimated hundreds-of-thousands of exit requests have been
granted, Poland, in accordance with a treaty concluded with
West Germany in 1975, is presently allowing more than 30,000
ethnic Germans to emigrate each year, until an agreed upon
149
number of some 125,000 are resettled over a four-year period.
The West can look forward to an ever-increasing growth in
bilateral relations with Poland, who will nevertheless,
1 4 9
The Bulletin (Bonn) , official publication of the Press
and Information Office of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, No. 8, Vol. 24, Feb 24, 1976.
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continue to remain aligned militarily and economically with
The Soviet Bloc of socialist states.
EPILOGUE
Painful as it is to this author, it is necessary to recount
still another very important caveat in the development of
prospects for Poland's future. There will always be at least
one highly unpredictable factor that could frustrate the most
sophisticated political analyst, be he Kremlinologist , class-
ical theorist, or systems analyst. Soviet responses to
developments in Poland (or indeed anywhere that impacts on
perceived Soviet national interests) will, in the final anal-
ysis, be dependent upon certain decisions by the Soviet
leadership which itself is characterized by factional divi-
sions that can result in periods of either bureaucratic par-
alysis or bureaucratic inertia. These factions and interest
groups within the Soviet decision-making apparatus are them-
selves variegated and complex, in a state of continuous change.
Recent developments in the Soviet leadership suggest that
Soviet foreign policy is indeed affected by the on-going
power struggle and internal conflict within the Soviet regime.
Following a droning, ten-minute report of a speech by
Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev, Radio Moscow's 5 p.m. newscast
on May 24, 1977 aired this statement: "At a plenary meeting
of the Central Committee Nikolai Podgorny was relieved of
his duties as a member of the Politburo." Pravda carried
15QWashington Post, May 25, 1977, p. 1.
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the news the following morning, in the 2 6th paragraph of a
15129-paragraph account of the meeting. Yet on the very day
of Podgorny's dismissal, Pravda published a decree signed by
him (awarding Yugoslavia's Tito, the Order of the October
Revolution)
, and the Soviet President only recently completed an
apparently successful swing through Africa helping to expand
Soviet influence there. Thus came to an ignominious end the
career of a dutiful party leader who had served for 17 years
in the ruling Politburo. Time magazine stated the following
week that "the full story of Podgorny's dismissal may remain
forever behind the scrim that veils the Kremlin's backstage
152dramas." In another top-level dismissal, Konstantin Katu-
shev was replaced as the Party secretary in charge of rela-
tions with Eastern European regimes. One of the Secretariat's
youngest members, the 49-year-old Katushev was for many years
considered to be on a meteoric rise in Kremlin decision-
making. His replacement, Konstantin Rusakov, is a Brezhnev
protege believed to be more of a hard-liner with respect to
153
the independence of East European regimes. What is cer-
tain is that the pulling and tugging, — the maneuvering for
influence within the power structure of the Kremlin — indeed
goes on as bureaucratic fortunes and political personalities
continue in a state of change.
151Pravda , May 24, 1977
152Time, June 6, 1977, p. 35
153New York Times, May 25, 1977, p. 1.
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Therefore a specific Soviet response to a particular
stimulus, may vary considerably over time and place, and may
in fact be a product of fortuity or chance. This enigmatic
characteristic of bureaucratic decision-making has been
alluded to by one of our nation's most brilliant statesmen:
"The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable
to the observer — often, indeed, to the decider
himself ... .There will always be the dark and tangled
stretches in the decision-making process — mysterious
even to those who may be most intimately involved. "154
154
"Preface" to Theodore Sorenson, Decision-Making in






TEXT OF POLISH-SOVIET AGREEMENT
ON STATUS OF SOVIET TROOPS TEMPORARILY IN POLAND
(Reprinted from "World Documents," in Current History , Vol.
32, No. 187, March 1957)
ARTICLE 1
The temporary stationing of Soviet military units in Poland
may in no way infringe upon the sovereignty of the Polish
State and may not lead to their interference in the internal
affairs of the Polish Peoples' Republic.
ARTICLE 2
1. The strength of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed
on the territory of the Polish Peoples ' Republic and the
areas where they are stationed shall be defined on the basis
of separate agreements between the Government of the Polish
Peoples' Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.
2. Soviet troop movements on the territory of the Polish
Peoples ' Republic beyond the areas where they are stationed
shall in each case require the consent of the Government of
the Polish Peoples' Republic or of the Polish authorities
authorized by it.
3. Soviet troop exercises or maneuvers outside the areas
where they are stationed shall take place on the basis of
plans agreed with the Polish authorities or with the consent
of the Government of the Polish Peoples' Republic in each
case or with the Polish authorities authorized by it.
ARTICLE 3
Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the Polish
Peoples' Republic, persons forming part of these troops as
well as members of their families are obliged to respect and
preserve the provisions of Polish law.
ARTICLE 4
1. Soldiers of the Soviet troops stationed on the territory
of the Polish Peoples' Republic shall wear uniforms to which
they are entitled as well as shall have and bear arms in
accordance with the regulations of the Soviet Army.

2. Motorcars and motorcycles of the Soviet military units
should be equipped with a registration number and clear
markings. The registration numbers and markings shall be
fixed by the command of the Soviet troops and brought to
the notice of the proper Polish authorities.
3. The competent Polish authorities shall recognize a^
valid, without verification and without collecting any charge,
the driving licenses issued by the competent Soviet author-
ities to persons forming part of the Soviet troops stationed
on the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic.
ARTICLE 5
The mode of entry and exit of Soviet military units as well
as of persons forming part of the Soviet troops and the mem-
bers of the families of these persons, into Poland and from
Poland, problems concerning the regulations connected with
their stay on the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic,
as well as the kinds of documents required shall be defined
in a separate agreement of the Contracting Parties
.
ARTICLE 6
The mode and terms of use by Soviet troops of barracks, air-
fields, training grounds, firing grounds, including installa-
tions, electric power, public and trade facilities as well
as terms of payment shall be defined in separate agreements
between the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 7
The erection and establishment in the areas where Soviet
troops are stationed of buildings, airfields, roads, bridges,
permanent radio installations including the fixing of their
frequencies and power shall require the agreement of the
competent Polish authorities. Such agreement shall also be
required for the setting up of permanent servicing points
for the persons forming part of the Soviet troops outside
the areas where they are stationed.
ARTICLE 8
In cases when the Soviet troops vacate barracks used by them
as well as airfields, training grounds and firing grounds
including permanent installations, these objectives shall be
returned to the Polish authorities in a state fit for use.
Matters connected with the transfer to the Polish authorities
of objectives vacated by the Soviet troops on the territory
of the Polish Peoples' Republic, including objectives erected




Problems of jurisdiction connected with the stay of Soviet
troops on the territory of the Polish Peoples 1 Republic
shall be regulated in the following manner:
1. As a rule, Polish law shall apply and Polish courts,
the prosecutor's office as well as other competent Polish
authorities dealing with crimes and offenses shall act in
cases of crimes and offenses committed by persons forming
part of the Soviet troops or members of their familiar on
the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic. The military
prosecutor's office and the military courts of the Polish
Peoples ' Republic shall be the competent authority to deal
with cases of crimes committed by Soviet soldiers.
2. The provisions of Paragraph 1 of this article shall
not apply:
a) in cases when crimes or offenses have been com-
mitted by persons forming part of the Soviet troops or by
members of their families only against the Soviet Union and
also against persons forming part of the Soviet troops or
members of their families;
b) in cases when crimes or offenses have been com-
mitted by persons forming part of the Soviet troops while
carrying out service duties.
In the cases defined in sub-Paragraphs (a) and (b) competent
authority shall be Soviet courts as well as other organs
acting in accordance with Soviet law.
3. The competent Polish and Soviet authorities may
request each other to transfer or accept jurisdiction in
individual cases provided for in this article. Such requests
shall be examined in a spirit of friendliness
.
ARTICLE 10
In cases when crimes have been committed against the Soviet
troops stationed on the territory of the Polish Peoples'
Republic as well as against soldiers forming part of their
troops, the perpetrators shall bear the same responsibility
as in the case of crimes committed against the Polish armed
forces and Polish soldiers.
ARTICLE 11
1. The competent Polish and Soviet authorities shall grant
each other all assistance including legal assistance dealing




2. The principles and modes of granting the assistance men-
tioned in Point 1 of this Article shall be defined in a
separate agreement between the Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 12
On the motion of the competent Polish authorities a person
forming part of the Soviet troops, guilty of a breach of the
regulations of Polish law, shall be recalled from the terri-
tory of the Polish Peoples' Republic.
ARTICLE 13
1. The Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics agrees
to pay compensation to the Government of the Polish Peoples'
Republic
- for material damage which may be caused to the Polish
State by the action or failure to act by Soviet military
units or individual persons forming part of these units, as
well as
-foe damage which may be caused to Polish institutions
and citizens or citizens of other states staying on the terri-
tory of the Polish Peoples' Republic by Soviet military units
or persons forming part of these units while carrying out
service duties -
in both cases to the amount fixed by a Mixed Commission set
up in accordance with Article 19 of this Agreement on the basis
of submitted claims in accordance with the provisions of
Polish law. Disputes that may arise from the commitments of
Soviet military units shall come within the terms of reference
of the Mixed Commission on the same principles.
2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
also agrees to pay compensation to the Government of the Polish
Peoples' Republic for damage caused in the territory of the
Polish Peoples ' Republic to Polish institutions and citizens
of other states as a result of action or failure to act by
persons forming part of the Soviet troops not while fulfilling
service duties, as well as a result of action or failure to
act by members of the families of persons forming part of the
Soviet troops — in both cases to the value fixed by the
competent Polish courts on the basis of claims submitted in
relation to those responsible for the damage.
3. The Soviet side shall effect the payment of compensation
within three months counting from the day the Mixed Commis-
sion has issued its findings or the court verdict has become
binding. The competent Polish authorities shall pay the
claimant persons and institutions the sums fixed in the
decisions of the Mixed Commission or court.
90

4. Outstanding claims for compensation for damage at the
moment this Agreement comes into force, shall be considered
by the Mixed Commission.
ARTICLE 14
1. The Government of the Polish Peoples' Republic agrees to
pay compensation to the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics for damage which may be caused by the
action or failure to act by Polish state institutions to
Soviet military units stationed on the territory of the
Polish Peoples* Republic to their property or to persons
forming part of the Soviet troops — to the value fixed by
the Mixed Commission set up in accordance with Article 19 of
this Agreement, on the basis of submitted claims, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Polish law. Disputes that may
arise for the commitments of Polish state institutions in
relation to Soviet military units shall also come within the
terms of reference of the Mixed Commission on the same
principles.
2. The Government of the Polish Peoples' Republic also agrees
to pay compensation to the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics for damages caused to Soviet military
units stationed on the territory of the Polish Peoples'
Republic, to persons forming part of the Soviet troops as
well as to members of the families of these persons as a
result of the action or failure to act by Polish citizens —
to the value fixed by Polish courts on the basis of claims
submitted in relation to those who have caused the damages
.
ARTICLE 15
1. Separate agreements shall define the lines of communica-
tion, dates, order and terms of payment for the transit of
Soviet troops and military supplies across the territory of
the Polish Peoples' Republic.
2. The provisions of this Agreement, and in particular the
provisions concerning jurisdiction and responsibility for
damages shall apply correspondingly to Soviet troops passing
through the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic.
ARTICLE 16
Separate agreements shall regulate matters of the application
of taxation, customs and currency regulations in force in
Poland, as well as the application of regulations concerning
the imports and exports in relation to the Soviet troops
stationed on the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic,






In order to deal efficiently with current problems linked to
the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, the Government of
the Polish Peoples 1 Republic and the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics shall appoint their plenipoten-
tiaries to deal with matters connected with the stay of
Soviet troops in Poland.
ARTICLE 18
Under this Agreement: "a person forming part of the Soviet
troops" shall be:
(a) a soldier of the Soviet Army.
(b) a civilian who is a Soviet citizen employed in the
Soviet units in the Polish Peoples' Republic;
the "area where Soviet troops are stationed" is an area placed
at the disposal of Soviet troops covering the place of sta-
tioning of military units including training grounds, firing




To settle problems arising in connection with the interpreta-
tion and implementation of this Agreement and the agreements
provided for in this Agreement, a Polisy-Soviet Mixed Commis-
sion is hereby appointed to which each of the Contracting
Parties shall appoint three of its representatives. The Mixed
Commission shall act on the basis of rules adopted by it. The
seat of the Mixed Commission shall be in Warsaw. In cases when
the Mixed Commission is unable to settle a question referred
to it, this matter shall be settled through diplomatic channels
in the shortest possible time.
ARTICLE 20
This Agreement is subject to ratification and shall come into
force on the day ratification documents are exchanged and this
shall take place in Moscow.
ARTICLE 21
This Agreement shall remain in force while Soviet troops are
stationed on the territory of the Polish Peoples' Republic and
may be amended with the agreement of the Contracting Parties.
This Agreement was drawn up in Warsaw on December 17, 1956, in
two copies, each in Polish and in Russian and both texts have
equal binding force.
In proof of this the Plenipotentiaries mentioned above have
signed this Agreement and have affixed seals to it.
A. RAPACKI D. T. SHEPILOV




TREATY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY AND THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF POLAND
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Peoples ' Republic of
Poland
CONSIDERING that more than 25 years have passed since the end
of the Second World War, of which Poland became the first
victim and which inflicted great suffering on the nations of
Europe
,
CONSCIOUS that in both countries a new generation has mean-
while grown up to whom a peaceful future should be secured,
DESIRING to establish durable foundations for peaceful coex-
istence and the development of normal and good relations
between them,
ANXIOUS to strengthen peace and security in Europe,
AWARE that the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the
frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of all States in Europe within their present
frontiers are a basic condition for peace.
HAVE AGREED as follows:
ARTICLE I
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the Peoples' Republic
of Poland state in mutual agreement that the existing boundary
line the course of which is laid down in Chapter IX of the
Decisions of the Potsdam Conference of 2 August 1945 as run-
ning from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde , and
thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western
Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak
frontier, shall constitute the western State frontier of the
Peoples' Republic of Poland.
(2) They reaffirm the inviolability of their existing frontiers
now and in the future and undertake to respect each other's
territorial integrity without restriction.
15 5Reprinted with permission from Documentation Relating
to the Federal Government's Policy of Detente (Bonn: Press
and Information Office of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1974, pp. 24-26.
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(3) They declare that they have no territorial claims what-
soever against each other and that they will not assert such
claims in the future.
ARTICLE II
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the Peoples 1 Republic
of Poland shall in their mutual relations as well as in
matters of ensuring European and international security be
guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations.
(2) Accordingly they shall, pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of
the Charter of the United Nations, settle all their disputes
exclusively by peaceful means and refrain from any threat or
use of force in matters affecting European and international
security and in their mutual relations.
ARTICLE III
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany and the Peoples' Republic
of Poland shall take further steps towards full normalization
and a comprehensive development of their mutual relations of
which the present Treaty shall form the solid foundation.
(2) They agree that a broadening of their co-operation in
the sphere of economic, scientific, technological, cultural
and other relations is in their mutual interest.
ARTICLE IV
The present Treaty shall not affect any bilateral or multi-
lateral international arrangements previously concluded by
either Contracting Party or concerning them.
ARTICLE V
The present Treaty is subject to ratification and shall enter
into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of rat-
ification which shall take place in Bonn.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting
Parties have signed the present Treaty.
DONE at Warsaw on December 7, 1970 in two originals, each in
German and Polish languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
For the For the
Federal Republic Peoples' Republic
of Germany of Poland
Willy Brandt Jozef Cyrankiewicz




POLAND'S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT 156
GENERAL
Poland's Minister of Defense is the Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces, which he controls through the Ministry
of Defense and the Polish General Staff. He is responsible
to the National Defense Council and the Prime Minister.
Vice Ministers of Defense are usually the chiefs of the
General Staff, Main Political Directorate, Main Inspectorate
of training, and Main Inspectorate of Territorial Defense.
Commanders of the Navy, Air Force (including air defense
force), internal security forces, and frontier forces are
directly under the Defense Minister. Ground forces are com-
manded by the Minister himself through the General Staff and
the three military districts: These are: 1. Warsaw Mili-
tary District, 2. Pomeranian Military District, 3. Silesian
Military District.
Ultimate authority over the armed forces resides in the
Politburo, which determines broader policies and fundamental
strategy. Party influence is evident at all echelons of the
armed forces. Political officers are in all units. About
15% of all military personnel and 80% of all officers are
Party members.
15 6Information on Poland's defense establishment is
compiles from the following sources: The Military Balance
1976/1977 (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1976); John Erickson, Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force
Levels (Washington: U.S. Strategic Institute, 1976); and




Under a status of forces agreement with the USSR, two
Soviet divisions comprising the Northern Group of Forces
and a Soviet tactical air army (the 37th) , are stationed in
the country. Soviet forces headquarters in Poland is in
Legnica.
PERSONNEL
Wojciech Jaruzelski (Marshal) , Minister of Defense and
Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces.
Ludwik Janczyszyn (Vice-Admiral) , Navy Commander.
Henryk Pietraszkiewicz (Read-Admiral) , Chief of Naval Staff
Total Armed Forces: 293,000 (including 194,000 conscripts).
Reserves: 550,000
Para-Military: Territorial Defense Force — 80,000
(some equipped with tanks), Citizens' Militia — 350,000
Conscript Service: Army- 18 months, Air Force & Navy -
2 years
DEFENSE PRODUCTION
Annual Military Expenditure: $2 . 25-billion, (4.6% of GNP)
.
The Polish Army is equipped with Soviet-designed
weapons, including the Makarov 9mm machine pistol. Although
Soviet-designed, many of the weapons are believed to be
manufactured in Poland. This includes the AK and AKM series
of assault rifles and the 7.62mm RPK, RPD, PK/PKS , and PKT
machine guns
.
Small Arms and Armaments
:
Fabryka Broni w. Radomiu , Radom. Products include
9mm VIS SZ/35 pistol, Karabin 7.62mm automatic rifle.
Fabryka Broni Warszawe , Warsaw. Products include
Karabin WZ/43-52 7.62mm M-30 sub-machine gun.
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Naval Production and Main Shipbuilders:
Oksywie ship-yards. Production includes the Obluze
class large patrol craft.
Stocznia-Gdynia ship-yards. Production includes the
Krogulec class and P-43 ocean minesweepers.
Gdansk ship-yards. General naval production including
a new class of torpedo recovery vessel, the KII class.
Aerospace (Main Systems)
:
Polskie Zaklady Lotnicze , Warsaw. Products include
PZL 104 , TS II Iskra trainers, and An-2 transports.
Pantswowe Zaklady Lotnicze , Switnik. Products include
SW-IW and SW-2 (Polish-developed) helicopters. Also
Soviet Mi-2 and 2M helicopters.
PZL-Bielsko, Cieszynsla. Research and evelopment,
and Flight Test enter.
Aerospace (Engines)
:
Polskie Zaklady Lotnicze , Warsaw. Products include
SO-I/3 engine (for TS-II Iskra) and Isotov GTD 350
helicopter engine built under co-operative agreement
with the USSR.
Polish Aviation , Warsaw. Products include Meteor I,
2K, and 3 series of research rockets.
MILITARY ORDER OF BATTLE
Polish Army : ,fWojsko ladowe"
The Polish Peoples 1 Republic presently maintains the
strongest army, after the Soviet Union, within the Warsaw
Pact. It has a long-established and notable military tradi-
tion which extends not only to its ground forces, but also
to the sea and the air. The tank divisions and six of the
motorized-rifle divisions are in class 1 readiness. Polish
airborne forces are somewhat smaller in size than their
Soviet counterparts. The amphibious assault division is an









5 AA artillery regiments
3 anti-tank regiments
Equipment:
Tanks: (est) 4124 (3,800 medium T54/55 and T-62, some
older T-34, 300 PT-76 light, few dozen T-10 heavy)
APCs: Standard Soviet APCs are employed, including the
newer BMP-76 PB, Czechoslovak-designed OT-64 "SKOT"
wheeled APC with 14.5mm MG, the Hungarian-designed
FUG (OT-65) , and BRDM scout cars.
Artillery/Battlefield Missiles: The Polish Army uses
the full range of Soviet artillery from 85 through
152mm guns, as well as multiple rocket launchers. Wire-
guided anti-tank missiles include SAGGER, SNAPPER,
SWATTER. FROG- 7 and SCUD A/B tactical rocket and
missile systems are also in Polish service. Airborne
units use the ASU-57 and ASU-85 air-portable assault
guns
.
Air Defense Systems: In addition to the ZSU 23-4 and SZU
57-2 SP AA guns, Polisy forces are using the SA-7
and SA-9 missile systems (the latter mounted on
BRDM vehicles)
.
Polish Air Force : "Polski lotnictwo wojskowe"
Poland has the largest Air Force among Warsaw Pact nations
other than the Soviet Union.
Manpower: over 80,000 Reserves: 60,000
Combat Aircraft: 804
36 interceptor squadrons with 330 MIG-21 & 122 MIG-17/19.
15 fighter-ground attack squadrons with 190 MIG-17,
30 SU-7, and 10 SU-20.
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1 light bomber squadron (4 regiments) equipped with
23 11-28.
Transports: 45 An-12, An- 2, An-26, 11-14, 11-18, and
Tu-134.
Helicopters: 150 Mi-2 gunships, Mi-4 and Mi-8.
240 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles at about 40 SAM sites.
Polish Navy : "Marynarka wojenna"
This largest non-Soviet naval force is well trained, equipped
with a variety of naval vessels including destroyers
,
corvettes, submarines, FPBs , landing ships, and naval infantry
(marines) . The Polish Navy is also backed by a considerable
ship-building capacity and a large merchant marine, as well
as an important fishing fleet. There is a naval air arm,
though this is administered by the Polish Air Force, even
though the personnel wear naval uniform.
Manpower: 25,000 Reserves: 45,000
Destroyers: 2 Kotlin class with Goa missile
2 Skory class with static AA battery
Submarines: 6 Whiskey class
Corvettes: 2 Kronstadt class
Coastal Forces/Patrol Craft: 12 Osa class with Styx missiles
27 submarine chasers
21 large patrol craft
20 coastal patrol boats
Naval Air: 61 combat aircraft
4 fighter squadrons with MIG-15 & MIG-17
1 light bomber squadron with 10 11-2 8
2 helicopter squadrons with Mi-1, Mi-2, & Mi-4
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